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UNIFYING ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
THROUGH STEREOTYPE THEORY
by
*
Stephanie Bornstein
Has litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reached
the limit of its utility in advancing workplace equality? After four decades of forward progress on antidiscrimination law in the courts, Supreme Court decisions in the last decade have signaled a retrenchment,
disapproving of key theories scholars and advocates had pursued to address workplace discrimination in its modern, more subtle and structural
forms. Yet sex and race inequality at work endure, particularly in pay
and at the top of organizations.
Notably, while the Roberts Court majority appears skeptical that discrimination persists and resistant to recognizing the role of employers in continued inequality, one subset of discrimination cases has enjoyed relative
success in the courts: sex discrimination cases relying on the legal theory
of sex stereotyping. In particular, plaintiffs alleging that they were discriminated against at work based on the operation of sex stereotypes related to family caregiving responsibilities or transgender status have pushed
federal appellate and district courts toward a contemporary understanding of the operation of bias. Despite this unusual success during an otherwise bleak period in antidiscrimination law, advances in caregiver and
transgender discrimination lawsuits remain on the margins, siloed in
their own category of litigation.
This Article argues that theoretical and doctrinal advances in sex stereotyping cases have broad application, with the potential to reinvigorate
employment discrimination litigation under Title VII as a whole. The
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. For their
helpful comments and questions on presentations or drafts of this Article, my sincere
thanks to: Catherine Albiston, Samuel Bagenstos, Jessica Clarke, Nancy Dowd,
Heather Elliott, Michael Green, Stacy Hawkins, Laura Kessler, Nancy Levit, Shu-Yi
Oei, Shalini Ray, Sharon Rush, Sandra Sperino, Amy Stein, Kerri Stone, Deborah
Widiss, and Joan C. Williams. My thanks as well to the participants in the 2015 AALS
Midyear Meeting on Next Generation Issues on Sex, Gender & the Law; the New
Scholars Colloquia at the 2015 SEALS Annual Conference; the 2015 Annual
Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor & Employment Law; the 2015
Southeastern Junior-Senior Scholars Workshop; and the New & Emerging Voices in
Labor & Employment Law Workshop at the 2016 AALS Annual Conference. Thanks,
too, to Madonna Snowden and Avery Le for their excellent research assistance.

919

LCB_20_3_Art_04_Bornstein_Complete (Do Not Delete)

920

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

10/24/2016 8:29 AM

[Vol. 20:3

Article suggests that precedent from pioneering sex discrimination cases
can and should be applied to cases alleging discrimination on other bases, including race and national origin. It proposes a more coherent,
unified approach to antidiscrimination law that capitalizes on recent
courts’ recognition of the operation of sex stereotypes at work. In an era
in which the advancement of equality has stalled in both the workplace
and the Supreme Court, a unified approach to Title VII litigation
framed around stereotype theory offers an important path forward for antidiscrimination law.
Introduction ......................................................................................... 920
I.
The Fracturing of Antidiscrimination Law ......................... 927
A. The Road to Here: The Emergence of “Second Generation”
Discrimination .......................................................................... 927
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INTRODUCTION
Has litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reached
the limit of its utility in advancing workplace equality? After four decades
of forward progress in Supreme Court interpretations of the reach of Ti-
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1

tle VII and similar statutes, decisions during the Roberts Court era have
2
signaled a regression. The Court majority appears to have reached a
high point of skepticism about the persistence of intentional sex and race
discrimination and of resistance to holding employers responsible for
3
their role in continued workplace inequality. Where, in the past, legal
theories that pushed the definition of unlawful discrimination to match
4
modern manifestations of bias were met with some success, Court deci5
sions in the last decade indicate that such advancement has stalled.
6
No two cases illustrate this trend better than 2009’s Ricci v. DeStefano
7
and 2011’s Wal-Mart v. Dukes —decisions in which the Court limited the
reach of key legal theories designed to redress more modern, “second

1

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B; see, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517
(2013) (prohibiting a “mixed-motive” theory of proof for retaliation claims); Vance v.
Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (limiting who constitutes a “supervisor” for
purposes of hostile work environment claims); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)
(strengthening the “ministerial exception” for employer liability under Title VII);
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (limiting employer efforts to avoid disparate
impact claims); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (prohibiting a “mixed
motive” theory of proof under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); AT&T
Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009) (limiting time for bringing pregnancy
discrimination claims); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (permitting
mandatory arbitration of statutory discrimination claims); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (limiting time for bringing pay discrimination
claims, later abrogated by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–2,
123 Stat. 5–7 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012))). The Court has, however,
refused to narrow certain pieces of Title VII doctrine related to religious
discrimination, see Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015), pregnancy accommodation, see Young v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015), and anti-retaliation protections, see Burlington N.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
3
See infra Part I.B; see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554
(2011) (“[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation . . . would
select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce
no actionable disparity at all.”). The Roberts Court cases on affirmative action also
bear out this new skepticism, as exemplified by the Chief Justice’s notorious
statement in opposition to race-based affirmative action that “[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
4
See infra Part I; see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
(recognizing disparate impact theory); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986) (recognizing hostile work environment sexual harassment theory); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing mixed-motive liability and
stereotype theory).
5
See infra Part I.A.
6
557 U.S. 557.
7
131 S. Ct. 2541.
2
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8

generation” discrimination. For thirty years after Title VII’s enactment
in 1964, litigation efforts centered on enforcement to prohibit obvious, if
not overt, discrimination and harassment. By the mid-1990s, however,
workplace discrimination had become less explicit and more subtle, rela9
tional, and structural in nature. In response, scholars and advocates
breathed new life into Title VII by developing litigation theories that
adapted to reach this more covert operation of bias, focusing on liability
10
for employment decisions infected with implicit bias and challenging
directly workplace structures that appeared facially neutral but that had
11
disparate effects by sex or race. The use of implicit bias and disparate
impact theories as a means of reaching more diffuse, entrenched discrimination gained momentum in the lower courts and in practice from
the mid-1990s until the late-2000s, when both theories came before the
Roberts Court. In 2009, in Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court limited the reach
of the disparate impact theory by holding that an employer may not take
efforts to remedy a workplace practice that has discriminatory effects on
some without risking liability for intentional discrimination against oth12
ers whom the practice favors. Two years later, in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the
Court narrowly circumscribed the use of “social framework” evidence to
establish employer liability for workplace practices that fail to prevent the
13
operation of implicit bias and result in discrimination. As a result of
these decisions, the two most prominent theories that helped redress
workplace discrimination in its increasingly subtle and structural forms
have been—while not entirely proscribed—severely hobbled.
Yet employment inequality persists, particularly in pay and at the top
of organizational hierarchies. While Title VII litigation radically trans-

8

This term was coined by Columbia Law Professor Susan Sturm to describe how
“[c]ognitive
bias,
structures
of
decisionmaking,
and
patterns
of
interaction . . . replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of . . . continued
inequality.” Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 460 (2001). The trend of narrowing legal theories
designed to remedy second generation discrimination was also reflected in the
Court’s 2009 and 2013 decisions limiting the availability of the mixed-motive theory
of proof for age discrimination and retaliation claims. See generally Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (retaliation); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557
U.S. 167 (2009) (age).
9
See infra Part I.A. See generally Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 91, 95–99 (2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L.
Rev. 1161, 1199 (1995); Sturm, supra note 8, at 468–74.
10
See infra Part II.B.2. See generally Krieger, supra note 9, at 1241–42.
11
See infra Part II.B.1. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking
Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 911 (2006).
12
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009).
13
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553–54 (2011).
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formed the ability of women and racial minorities to enter the workforce
14
and to be protected from workplace harassment, equal pay and equal
access to advancement opportunities remain elusive, occupational segregation persists stubbornly, and race and sex diversity diminishes the
higher you go up the chain of command at many organizations. Data
from 2013 on the gender wage gap shows that women engaged in fulltime year-round work earn only 78 cents to every dollar that white men
15
earn—a figure that has remained stagnant since 2001. For women of
color, the data is worse: in 2013, Latinas earned only 54 cents and Afri16
can-American women only 64 cents to the dollar. Studies of diversity at
the top of a variety of fields show that women and racial minorities are
still drastically underrepresented in leadership. Despite making up nearly
half of the U.S. workforce, women are only 8.1% of the country’s top
earners, 4.6% of CEOs in the Fortune 500, and 14 to 16% of corporate
executive officers, law firm equity partners, and senior management in
17
Silicon Valley. Likewise, while racial minorities make up one-third of
the U.S. workforce, only 4.2% of Fortune 500 CEOs and 5.6% of law firm
18
equity partners are people of color. Segregation among jobs and industries by sex and race appears as intractable as ever: recent studies identified that over 40% of women (or men) would have to change jobs for the
19
U.S. workforce to be fully integrated by gender.
Of course, data on inequality at work does not prove discrimination:
Demographic realities, individual choices, and legitimate business decisions all likely contribute to continued workplace disparities by sex and
14

See generally U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, American Experiences
Versus American Expectations (July 2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
reports/american_experiences/index.cfm (documenting impact of Title VII from 1966
to 2013).
15

See Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, The Simple Truth About the Gender Pay
Gap 3 (2015).
16
Id. at 11.
17
See Judith Warner, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The Women’s Leadership Gap:
Women’s Leadership by the Numbers 1–2 (2014).
18
See Crosby Burns, Kimberly Barton & Sophia Kerby, Ctr. for Am.
Progress, The State of Diversity in Today’s Workforce: As Our Nation
Becomes More Diverse So Too Does Our Workforce 2, 5 (2012); Despite Small
Gains in the Representation of Women and Minorities Among Equity Partners, Broad
Disparities Remain, NALP Bull. (June 2015), http://www.nalp.org/0615research.
19
See Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Framed by Gender: How Gender Inequality
Persists in the Modern World 5 (2011) (citations omitted); Youngjoo Cha,
Overwork and the Persistence of Gender Segregation in Occupations, 27 Gender & Soc’y 158,
159 (2013); see also Darrick Hamilton, Algernon Austin & William Darity Jr., Econ.
Policy Inst., Whiter Jobs, Higher Wages: Occupational Segregation and the Lower Wages of
Black Men (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/BriefingPaper288.pdf;
Derek Thompson, The Workforce Is Even More Divided by Race Than You Think, Atlantic
Monthly (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/11
/the-workforce-is-even-more-divided-by-race-than-you-think/281175/.
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race. But, as differences in workforce participation rates and educational
achievement by sex and race diminish over time, the proportion of persistent inequality that may be attributable to discrimination—whether
conscious or not—grows. In 2010, over one-quarter of all Bachelor’s,
Master’s, and Doctorate degrees were earned by racial minorities, up
20
from just over 20% a decade earlier. In 2010, between 53 and 63% of all
such degrees were earned by women, with women in every racial category
earning more than half of all degrees conferred—up from between 47
21
and 60% a decade earlier. Arguments that there are not enough qualified women and people of color in the pipeline to work in middle and
upper management ring increasingly hollow.
Given this state of affairs in the Supreme Court and in the workplace, it may appear that antidiscrimination litigation under Title VII has
run its course as a means of reaching entrenched bias at work. In contrast
to the generally bleak picture of the state of antidiscrimination law over
the past decade, however, one bright spot offers a way forward. In the
same time period that the Supreme Court has restricted two key legal
theories for challenging contemporary discrimination, one subset of employment discrimination cases has enjoyed relative success in the courts:
22
sex discrimination lawsuits relying on the legal theory of stereotyping.
In particular, plaintiffs alleging that they were discriminated against at
work based on the operation of sex stereotypes related to their family
23
caregiving responsibilities or transgender status have pushed federal
district and appellate courts toward a modern understanding of the operation of bias in its more covert and structural forms. Yet despite the
unusual success of the stereotyping approach during a period in which
24
antidiscrimination law was otherwise narrowed by the Court, advances

20

See Fast Facts: Degrees Conferred by Sex and Race, Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics
(May 2012), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012045.pdf.
21
See id.
22
By “success” here and throughout the Article, I mean success on a dispositive
procedural motion, such as a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Because so
few employment discrimination cases go to trial, the ability of a plaintiff to defeat a
defendant’s dispositive motion often proves determinative in the case (for example,
by leading to settlement). The development of Title VII doctrine has occurred
primarily through federal court decisions on such pleadings. See Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on
Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517, 518 (2010).
23
For conciseness and consistency, I use the term “transgender status” and
“transgender discrimination” to refer to all cases alleging discrimination on the basis
of gender identity or expression where a plaintiff’s self-identity or presentation differs
from assigned sex at birth (e.g., many plaintiffs are identified in their cases as
“transsexual”). This does not, however, encompass the separate concept of
discrimination based on “sexual orientation,” which has been treated differently from
gender identity under the law of Title VII by many federal courts. See infra note 182.
24
See infra Part I.B.3.
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in caregiver and transgender discrimination cases remain on the margins, generally regarded as their own category of litigation.
This Article argues that there is still room for progress toward greater workplace equality by drawing on novel litigation theories under Title
VII. Doctrinal and theoretical advances in cutting-edge sex stereotyping
cases have broad application that can reinvigorate employment discrimination litigation as a whole. The Article identifies how federal courts’
understanding of sex stereotypes in the context of motherhood and gender identity demonstrate courts’ ability to apply traditional employment
discrimination doctrine in a more nuanced and contemporary way. If
courts are able to perceive potential discrimination based on such stereotypes, this Article argues, they can and should apply this lens to all cases
in which there is evidence of unlawful stereotyping, regardless of the protected classification. Courts’ understanding of the operation of impermissible stereotypes at work is essential to the development of antidiscrimination law as a whole because very few employment discrimination
cases ever get to a jury—a judge’s decision on a motion to dismiss or for
25
summary judgment makes or breaks most cases. By identifying and analyzing court decisions in recent sex stereotyping litigation, the Article
aims to construct a more coherent, contemporary approach to recognizing bias in all Title VII cases that can pave a way forward in the era of
26
Wal-Mart and Ricci.
Recent Supreme Court constraints on implicit bias and disparate
impact theories have been in the context of cases seeking class-wide relief, whereas sex stereotyping theories have been successful mostly in cases seeking individual relief. Nevertheless, if courts can recognize how stereotypes operate to disadvantage individual transgender and caregiver
plaintiffs at work, the Article argues, this insight can be extended to bolster both individual and class cases alleging similar patterns of stereotyping regardless of protected class. And arguably, the Supreme Court could
act to curtail the sex stereotyping approach to Title VII litigation, as it has
done with implicit bias and disparate impact theories. Yet, to date, the
Court has not overturned expansive appellate court readings of stereo27
type theory, which the Court itself created in its germinal 1989 case Price
28
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
25

See supra note 22.
This Article focuses on unification of legal theories across different protected
classes under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and related federal statutes.
Alignment with antidiscrimination standards under the constitutional law of Equal
Protection is beyond its scope. For a discussion of points of “convergence” and
“divergence” between Title VII and Equal Protection doctrine, see generally Stephen
M. Rich, One Law of Race?, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 201 (2014).
27
The Supreme Court has left undisturbed numerous federal circuit court cases
in which plaintiffs successfully alleged caregiver or transgender discrimination using a
sex stereotyping theory. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011)
26
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In Part I, the Article begins with a brief background on how antidiscrimination efforts have shifted over time, from redressing overt exclusion and harassment in its first three decades, to its second generation
phase of remedying more subtle discrimination. Part I then identifies
how litigation strategies for responding to second generation discrimination forked into three main paths. One path focused on using disparate
impact and accommodation theories to directly challenge workplace
structures that fostered discrimination. A second path used the field of
implicit bias to broaden the concept of intentional discrimination under
the theory of disparate treatment. As Part I explains, both paths now face
significant roadblocks erected by recent Supreme Court decisions. Yet a
third path developed in the context of sex discrimination cases that has
yet to face similar hurdles: stereotype theory. Part I concludes by documenting the development of this parallel track of litigation which, while
not entirely unimpeded, has largely withstood the Roberts Court era.
In Part II, the Article picks up this third path of antidiscrimination
litigation using stereotype theory, with a focus on plaintiff successes in
recent sex stereotyping cases. Part II articulates two theoretical and doctrinal advances from innovative areas of antidiscrimination law—
caregiver or family responsibilities discrimination and transgender status
discrimination—and argues that courts can and should apply these advances to antidiscrimination law across all protected classes. First, recent
sex stereotyping cases have helped establish that an employee need not
provide evidence of others outside of the employee’s protected class who
were treated better to prove intentional discrimination. An employer’s
adverse action in reliance on impermissible stereotypes may, itself, consti29
tute unlawful discrimination. Second, recent sex stereotyping cases have
recast and broadened the types of evidence that may be persuasive in a
discrimination case. What courts might once have discounted as mere
“stray remarks” or not “direct evidence” of a discriminatory motive may
now be reframed as stereotyping evidence under a stereotype theory of
liability. These two concepts, of “comparators” and “stray remarks,” are
doctrinal relics of first generation discrimination law that persist to undermine many plaintiffs’ legitimate second generation claims today. In
(transgender status discrimination); Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.
2009) (caregiver discrimination); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)
(transgender status discrimination); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch.
Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (caregiver discrimination).
28

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989); see infra Part I.B.3.
See infra Part II.A; see also, e.g., Back, 365 F.3d at 122 (“[S]tereotyping of women
as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an impermissible, sexbased motive.”); Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with
Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Commission (May 23, 2007),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance]
(“[W]hile comparative evidence is often useful, it is not necessary to establish a
violation.”).
29
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the context of caregiver and transgender discrimination, however, some
federal courts have seen beyond these limitations.
In Part III, the Article turns to why and how stereotype theory has
had a limited reach beyond the context of sex discrimination. It then
constructs a universal approach to incorporate developments in this area
to the rest of antidiscrimination law—first, by showing how unlawful stereotyping may go unrecognized in race discrimination cases, and then,
by illustrating how stereotyping evidence may help to overcome recent
constraints imposed on class-wide disparate impact and implicit bias theories by the Supreme Court.
Ultimately, the Article concludes, evolution in the subset of sex stereotyping cases during an otherwise grim period in the advancement of
antidiscrimination law has yet to be integrated into mainstream thinking
about second generation employment discrimination. With disparate
impact and implicit bias theories now constrained by the Supreme Court,
the stereotype frame offers plaintiffs a new bridge from first generation
doctrine to remedying second generation discrimination. It also suggests
a more coherent, modern approach to redressing continued inequality
in the workplace that treats long-established social science on gender and
racial bias equally—an approach that may prevent Title VII from becoming ossified before its work is complete.
I. THE FRACTURING OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
For the first three decades after Title VII was enacted in 1964, litigation under the statute made great strides in changing U.S. workplaces by
rooting out overt discrimination and exclusion. By the mid-1990s, overt
discrimination had declined dramatically, yet more subtle and structural
bias remained. Since then, legal theories for pursuing a claim of discrimination have diverged, with plaintiffs following one or more separate
paths. From the early 1990s until 2005, many federal courts were receptive to arguments based on the changing nature of bias, and modern legal theories for litigating second generation discrimination gained mo30
mentum. In the last decade, however, two of the most promising paths
to redress contemporary discrimination have been severely constrained
by decisions of the Roberts Court.
A. The Road to Here: The Emergence of “Second Generation” Discrimination
When Title VII was enacted in 1964, it prohibited both overt discrimination in “terms, conditions, or privileges” of work and the adoption of
any policies or practices that “deprive[d] any individual of employment
opportunities” “because of” a protected classification (“race, color, reli30

See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993); Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 250.
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31

gion, sex, or national origin”). In cases decided throughout the twenty
years after the statute’s enactment, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted
these two parallel enforcement provisions to provide the basis for two
main causes of action for discrimination—disparate treatment and dis32
parate impact. Using a disparate treatment approach, plaintiffs must
prove that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination against
them, which plaintiffs can do by providing either direct or circumstantial
evidence that the employer cannot rebut with a nondiscriminatory justi33
fication. Alternatively, using a disparate impact theory, plaintiffs must
prove that the employer adopted a policy or practice that appeared neutral on its face but that resulted in a disproportionately negative impact
on members of a protected class, and that the employer’s use of that policy is not justified by some “business necessity” that a less discriminatory
34
policy could not also meet. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, cases
alleging one or both of these two legal claims made significant headway
in redressing discrimination and advancing the employment opportuni35
ties of women and racial and ethnic minorities.
By the late 1980s, awareness of antidiscrimination laws had become
widespread and workplaces had been opened up to more diverse work36
forces. The manifestations of discriminatory bias moved from exclusion
at the hiring gate to hostile treatment and exclusion from advancement
37
opportunities within the workplace. In particular, in the context of the
protected class of sex, hostile treatment of female employees and attitudes that held women to sex role stereotypes led the Supreme Court to
recognize two additional ways to prove sex discrimination. In 1986, in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court recognized that sexual harassment, including creating a hostile work environment that interferes with
a female employee’s ability to do her job, constitutes discrimination in
the conditions of work—thus creating the harassment theory of proving
38
disparate treatment. Three years later, in the 1989 case Price Waterhouse
31

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Int’l
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
33
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 305 n.9; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336;
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The specific framework of proof depends on
whether the case is brought as an individual disparate treatment case or by a class
alleging that the employer engaged in a “pattern or practice” of intentional
discrimination. Compare McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04 with Hazelwood Sch.
Dist., 433 U.S. at 304.
34
See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
35
See 35 Years of Ensuring the Promise of Opportunity, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/history/index.html.
36
See id.
37
Sturm, supra note 8, at 460.
38
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (1986).
32
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v. Hopkins, the Court recognized that, where stereotypes of how a female
employee should appear and behave as a woman played a role in an adverse employment decision against her, she could allege sex discrimination, thus creating the sex stereotype theory of proving disparate treat39
ment. Neither harassment nor stereotype theory created a new cause of
action; instead, both presented new routes for proving disparate treatment that reflected the changing nature of employment discrimination
40
more than two decades after the adoption of Title VII.
Two years later, based in part on recognition of the concept in the
Price Waterhouse decision, Congress amended Title VII in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 to allow an additional legal option of alleging a mixed-motive
41
theory of disparate treatment. Under a mixed-motive approach, a plaintiff can allege unlawful discrimination when a protected classification
played a “motivating factor” in an adverse employment decision, even if it
42
was not the only factor. Bolstered by the additional theories of proof for
harassment, stereotyping, and mixed-motives, disparate treatment and
disparate impact claims continued to redress employment discrimination
43
throughout the 1990s.
Yet by the late 1990s and into the early 2000s, advances in workplace
44
equality appeared to have stalled. Disparities in employment equality
for women and racial minorities continued to persist, particularly apparent in unequal compensation and the lack of diversity at the middle and
45
top of organizations—disparities that continue today. Despite the development of additional legal theories of proof, scholars and employee
advocates began to identify that the operation of bias ran deeper, was
more ingrained and entrenched in ways that existing theories of Title VII
were still unable to reach. In an influential article published in 2001, Susan Sturm put a name to this phenomenon: “second generation” discrim46
ination.
Since then, numerous scholars have identified the features of second
generation discrimination (also referred to as “structural” employment

39

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
Also, neither hostile treatment nor stereotyping were always actionable: hostile
treatment had to be based on a protected class and be severe or pervasive enough to
interfere with work to constitute discrimination, Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64, 67, and
protected class stereotypes had to actually play a role in an adverse employment
decision to violate Title VII, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
41
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–166, S. 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)).
42
Id.
43
See 35 Years of Ensuring the Promise of Opportunity, supra note 35.
44
See supra notes 15–19.
45
Id.
46
Sturm, supra note 8, at 460.
40

LCB_20_3_Art_04_Bornstein_Complete (Do Not Delete)

930

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

10/24/2016 8:29 AM

[Vol. 20:3

47

discrimination); virtually all employment discrimination claims today
48
involve some second generation components. Second generation discrimination involves bias that is more subtle, suppressed, and implicit—as
opposed to explicit or recognized by those who hold it—which means it
49
is often hidden or covert and harder to prove. (For example, implicit
biases about gender may affect how a manager perceives an employee’s
performance: the manager assesses an assertive male employee as a
50
“leader,” but an assertive female employee as “difficult” or “bossy.”)
Second generation discrimination may also be diffuse and structural,
embedded in a variety of workplace practices, which means that it is
51
harder to pinpoint as discrete and may compound over time. (Continuing with the example, based on the manager’s assessment, the manager
appoints the male employee as team leader to develop his potential and
encourages the female employee to develop her collaboration skills.
Based on this feedback, the male employee reaches for challenging assignments while the female employee spends significant time doing support work for the team.) Lastly, second generation discrimination may be
relational, interactional, and contextual, meaning that it is fostered by
52
workplace relationships and culture. (In the example, when the male
employee, having shown initiative as a team leader, gets selected for a
plum assignment, the female employee picks up the slack so the team will
succeed. When the opportunity for a promotion arises, if both employees
have similar education and years at work, which is more likely to be
judged better qualified for the promotion?)
These complexities make second generation discrimination difficult
to litigate under statutory doctrine developed in the 1960s. In particular,
as discussed in Part II, below, two outdated concepts developed through
case law redressing first generation cases remain enmeshed in Title VII
doctrine, posing hurdles to plaintiffs challenging modern discrimination:
the “comparator requirement” that expects a similarly situated employee
47

See id.
See, e.g., id. at 479; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (2006); Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics, supra note 9, at 131; Sullivan, Disparate Impact, supra note 11, at
998–99.
49
See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 48, at 5–10; Krieger, supra
note 9, at 1164–65, 1241.
50
See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes
Prevent Women’s Ascent Up the Organizational Ladder, 57 J. Social Issues 666–69 (2001);
Ban Bossy: Leadership Tips for Managers, LeanIn.org & Girl Scouts of USA, http://
banbossy.com/wp-content/themes/leanin/ui/microsite/ban-bossy/resources/Ban_
Bossy_Leadership_Tips_for_managers.pdf?v=1&77f96d.
51
See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 48, at 12–13; Green,
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 9, at 99; Sturm, supra note 8, at 468–69.
52
See, e.g., Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 9, at 92; Sturm,
supra note 8, at 470–71.
48
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outside the plaintiff’s protected class who was treated better than the
53
plaintiff, and the “stray remarks” doctrine that discounts potentially useful evidence of stereotypical thinking where it is deemed to be too re54
moved from the adverse employment action in question.
What is more, despite the significant shift in how unlawful bias mani55
fests itself in the workplace today, with one small exception, Congress
has made no amendment to Title VII since 1991. Thus, for Title VII to
continue to be useful in advancing equality at work, modernization of the
doctrine has had to occur through the interpretation of the law by the
federal courts.
B. Forks and Roadblocks: Three Paths for Litigating Second Generation
Discrimination
Over the past 15 years, scholars and employee advocates have worked
to frame litigation under the existing doctrine of Title VII to reach bias
in its modern forms. Three main paths for litigating second generation
56
claims have emerged. One path attacks the workplace practices that
support second generation discrimination head on, using structural litigation theories including disparate impact and accommodation. A second path focuses on using disparate treatment theory to unmask and
hold the employer accountable for its policies that allow the operation of
unchecked implicit biases in the workplace. While both of these approaches have provided doctrinal advancements and been met with some
success, in recent years, both have been constrained by decisions of the
57
Roberts Court. A third path focuses on how impermissible stereotypes
factor into workplace decisions and cultures, resulting in unlawful dis53

See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.B.1.
55
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–12, 123 Stat. 5–7
(codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)) (extending time period for filing pay
discrimination complaints).
56
Note that this Article focuses on litigation paths under Title VII, but much
scholarship has been devoted to ways to reduce and redress second generation
discrimination outside of the context of litigation—for example, through regulatory,
employer-driven, tort, and corporate law approaches. See, e.g., Richard Thompson
Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1381,
1420 (2014); Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 9, at 144–51;
Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer
Wrong, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 849, 903–04 (2007); Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding
Discrimination: Considering Compliance and Liability, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1623, 1648
(2007); Sandra E. Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability for Title VII, 61
Ala. L. Rev. 773, 786 (2010); Sturm, supra note 8, at 459–65. In fact, Susan Sturm’s
germinal article suggested the limits of a litigation-focused approach. See id. at 475–
78. Discussion of this scholarship is beyond the scope of this Article’s focus on
currently available paths of litigation.
57
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
54
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crimination. This stereotyping approach has also advanced the law, and
has not been similarly restricted by the Court. It has, however, had limited application beyond the protected classification of sex, which suggests
the potential for its future expansion.
1. Structural Litigation and Disparate Impact Theory
One path for responding to second generation discrimination is to
directly litigate the workplace structures that foster second generation
discrimination. A decade ago, in separate works, Charles Sullivan and
Samuel Bagenstos suggested this could be accomplished by using arguably more “structural” theories of litigation, including disparate impact
claims, disparate treatment claims for denial of accommodation, and ef58
forts at affirmative action. The significant benefit of this approach is
that it limits the need for a plaintiff to prove that an employer has acted
with discriminatory intent—the most difficult part of litigating second
59
generation claims, in which biases are often implicit.
Indeed, decisions by the Roberts Court have borne out the partial
success of this strategy. In addition to the main disparate treatment and
60
disparate impact prohibitions described above, Title VII includes two
express accommodation requirements: for discrimination because of sex,
that pregnant employees be treated “the same” as all other employees
61
“similar in their ability or inability to work”; for religious discrimination,
that
an
employer “reasonably
accommodate . . . an
employee’s . . . religious observance or practice” unless it poses an “undue hard62
ship” on the business. In two decisions in its 2015 term, the Supreme
Court interpreted these provisions at least partially in favor of employees
63
seeking such accommodations. To the extent that a denial of accommodation in either of these circumstances reflects second generation discrimination—for example, a work policy of denying routine accommodations to only pregnant workers based on implicit assumptions that work
64
and pregnancy are incompatible—this approach provides some redress.

58

Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 48, at 16–18; Sullivan, Disparate
Impact, supra note 11, at 984–996.
59
See Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 48, at 44–45; Sullivan, Disparate
Impact, supra note 11, at 937–38.
60
See supra Part I.A.
61
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
62
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
63
See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015); Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355 (2015);
see also Joanna L. Grossman, Expanding the Core: Pregnancy Discrimination Law as it Approaches
Full Term, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 825, 849–60 (2016).
64

For a proposal to apply an accommodation approach to all sex and gender
discrimination cases, see Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 Duke L.J.
891 (2014).
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Yet the more broad-reaching theory of disparate impact and related
efforts at affirmative action have not fared so well. To begin with, as Sullivan, Bagenstos, and others acknowledge, the disparate impact framework
generally appeals less to plaintiffs because it provides no right to a jury
trial and limited remedies (compensatory and punitive damages are only
available for intentional discrimination under Title VII), and because the
employer has a broad affirmative defense where any policy that results in
65
a disparate impact serves a legitimate “business necessity.” That said,
plaintiffs have successfully litigated disparate impact claims that challenge workplace structures that may foster second generation discrimination—for example, the practice of using subjective decision-making for
66
promotions and policies limiting the use of sick days that disadvantage
67
family caregivers.
More problematic is the Roberts Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci v.
DeStefano circumscribing the reach of disparate impact and limiting its
use to accomplish any sort of affirmative effort toward workplace equali68
ty. In Ricci, the Court held that a fire department with a long history of
racial discrimination in hiring went too far when it threw out the results
of an employment test that showed a significant disparate impact on Afri69
can-American applicants. When white applicants sued to force the department to reinstate the test results, the Court majority perceived the
fire department’s actions as disparate treatment against the white appli70
cants. The Court created a new, heightened standard within disparate
impact analysis, forcing an employer to, in effect, prove that its policy or
practice created a disparate impact before the employer can take any
71
such affirmative measures. With this, the Court majority hamstrung the
reach of disparate impact, while evincing its general hostility toward the
theory except as a way to expose or “smoke out” hidden intentional dis72
crimination.
65

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Bagenstos, The
Structural Turn, supra note 48, at 21–24; Sullivan, Disparate Impact, supra note 11, at
968, 993. See generally Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53
UCLA L. Rev. 701 (2006) (describing disparate impact’s limitations).
66
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988).
67
See Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rule
prohibiting leave in excess of ten days as applied to pregnant woman); Roberts v. U.S.
Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (policy that employees could
not use sick days to care for sick children).
68
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009).
69
Id. at 585.
70
Id. at 593.
71
Id. at 584.
72
Id. at 595 (Scalia, J. concurring) (“It might be possible to defend the law by
framing it as simply an evidentiary tool used to identify genuine, intentional
discrimination—to ‘smoke out,’ as it were, disparate treatment. . . . But arguably the
disparate-impact provisions sweep too broadly to be fairly characterized in such a
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Worth noting, however, is that in the 2015 case Texas Department of
73
Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., the
Court held, by reference to Title VII, that disparate impact claims were
available under the analogous Federal Housing Act. This decision indicates that, despite constraints placed on disparate impact in Ricci and
warnings by Justice Scalia of a coming conflict with Equal Protection
74
law, disparate impact theory survives another day. Yet, in writing for the
Texas Department of Housing Court majority, Justice Kennedy was careful to
both avoid constitutional matters and continue to read disparate impact
narrowly, warning that disparate impact remedies should “strive
to . . . eliminate racial disparities through race-neutral means” and be
mindful not to “perpetuate race-based considerations rather than move
75
beyond them.” Thus, while not entirely lost, the disparate impact path
76
for remedying second generation discrimination has been narrowed.
2. Implicit Bias and Social Framework Theory
The second path for responding to second generation discrimination at work is to allege disparate treatment under Title VII and use the
social science of implicit bias to create an inference of discriminatory intent. Linda Krieger first articulated this theory in a path-breaking article
77
published in 1995. Since then, numerous scholars in both law and social
78
science have contributed to its development and popularization. Under
fashion. . . .” (citations omitted)).
73
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015).
74
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 595–96 (Scalia, J. concurring).
75
Tex. Dep’t of Hous., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
76
See generally Deborah A. Widiss, Griggs at Midlife, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 993 (2015)
(discussing disparate impact’s continued viability); Richard A. Primus, Of Visible RaceConsciousness and Institutional Role: Equal Protection and Disparate Impact after Ricci and
Inclusive Communities, in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act After 50 Years: Proceedings
of the New York University 67th Annual Conference on Labor, 295–318 (2015)
(same); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and
Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 Cornell L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2016) (same).
77
See Krieger, supra note 9, at 1164–65.
78
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law,
1 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 477 (2007); Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good
Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95
Va. L. Rev. 1893 (2009); Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from
Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1241 (2002); Martha Chamallas, Deepening
the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev.
747 (2001); Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 9; Melissa Hart,
Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 741 (2005);
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 969
(2006); Jerry Kang, et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124 (2012);
Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 997, 1003
n.21 (2006) (cataloguing the literature on implicit bias); Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La
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this approach, evidence on the operation of implicit biases—that is, biases and associations that affect our perceptions and judgments without
our conscious awareness—is offered to create an inference of intentional
discrimination when workplace decisions have discriminatory results, but
79
the decision makers do not believe they harbor animus. Implicit bias evidence has been used in individual cases and, more commonly, in combination with what is known as “social framework” evidence on the types
of organizational structures that are more likely to activate decision makers’ implicit biases, to allege class-wide pattern or practice discrimina80
tion. Where an employer relies on work structures known to activate unlawful implicit biases—for example, unchecked subjective decisionmaking for promotions—and there are statistical disparities by protected
class in that workforce, this theory argues, the employer should be held
liable for intentional discrimination for failing to prevent or correct the
81
operation of implicit bias. The significant appeal of this approach is that
it actually addresses part of the underlying cause of second generation
discrimination. A number of federal courts have agreed and upheld
plaintiffs’ cases using implicit bias to allege discrimination on the basis of
82
sex or race.
Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 415
(2000); Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and “Innocent
Mistakes,” 55 Vand. L. Rev. 481 (2002); Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making,
61 La. L. Rev. 495 (2001). But see, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock,
Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 1023 (2006); Amy
L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 Ind. L.J. 1129 (1999); Amy L. Wax, The
Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 979 (2008).
79
See Krieger, supra note 9, at 1179–80; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 78, at 1004.
80
See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 78, at 1005.
81
See id. at 1052–53.
82
See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The
Supreme Court has long recognized that unlawful discrimination can stem from
stereotypes and other types of cognitive biases, as well as from conscious animus”)
(race discrimination); see also Burns v. Johnson, 2016 WL 3675157, *7 (1st Cir. July
11, 2016) (“As this circuit has repeatedly held, stereotyping, cognitive bias, and
certain other ‘more subtle cognitive phenomena which can skew perception and
judgments’ also fall within the ambit of Title VII's prohibition” (quoting Thomas, 183
F.3d at 61))(sex discrimination); Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1265, 1272
(10th Cir. 1988) (sex discrimination); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Inland
Marine Indust., 729 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984) (race discrimination); Dow v.
Donovan, 150 F. Supp. 2d, 249, 263–64 (D. Mass. 2001) (sex discrimination); Kimble
v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F.Supp.2d 765, 775–78 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (race
discrimination). But see, e.g., Tucker v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2009 WL 2135807, *6
(S.D. Ga. 2009) (“At least in this Circuit, a ‘subtle bias’ claim based on subconscious
cognitive stereotypes is not tenable as a disparate treatment claim”). Courts have also
recognized the operation of age-related stereotypes in cases alleging disparate
treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621–34. See,
e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1993); Brooks v. Woodline
Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061, 1064 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Synock v. Milwaukee
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Yet despite initial success, this approach now faces an uphill battle.
After growing in popularity and acceptance, in both practice and the
courts, the social framework piece of the implicit bias theory has suffered
a steady backlash from a small group of academics who oppose it, includ83
ing the coiners of the term “social frameworks.” An academic backlash
in and of itself may pose no threat to a legal theory, but federal courts—
84
including the U.S. Supreme Court—have taken notice. In its 2011 decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Court rejected certification of a nationwide
class of plaintiffs alleging sex discrimination in pay and promotion result85
ing from widespread unchecked biased subjective decision making.
While the Wal-Mart decision focused on class certification only, in deciding whether the plaintiff class met the test for “commonality” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court took a swipe at the implicit bias
social framework theory more generally. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ expert social framework evidence, noting that because the expert
could not specify what percentage of decisions at the company were infected by implicit bias, the testimony “[did] nothing to advance [the plain86
tiffs’] case” and the Court could “safely disregard” it. Ultimately, the
Court viewed the case as lacking the commonality necessary to support
class certification because it sought to aggregate the harms of “literally
millions of employment decisions at once . . . [w]ithout some glue hold87
ing the alleged reasons for all those decisions together.” In a symposium
on the future of systemic disparate treatment in the wake of the Wal-Mart
decision, Michael Selmi, Noah Zatz, and Tristin Green, in separate pieces, each identified the challenge moving forward as identifying a way to
hold the employer entity liable for intentional discrimination based on
88
individual employment decisions infected with implicit bias. To succeed, Selmi and Zatz suggested, future cases would need greater “connective tissue” or a more “coherent narrative” of discrimination for plain89
tiffs to prevail.
Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981)); Rand v. New Hampton Sch., 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6188, *15 (D.N.H. Apr. 24, 2000).
83
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 n.8 (2011); see Mitchell &
Tetlock, supra note 78, at 1055; John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell,
Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 Va.
L. Rev. 1715 (2008).
84
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 n.8.
85
Id. at 2550–61.
86
Id. at 2554.
87
Id. at 2552.
88
Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 Berkeley J.
Emp. & Lab. L. 395, 397 (2011); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment
Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 477, 481 (2011); Noah D.
Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 387, 388 (2011).
89
Selmi, Theorizing, supra note 88, at 481; Zatz, supra note 88, at 388.

LCB_20_3_Art_04_Bornstein_Complete (Do Not Delete)

2016]

UNIFYING ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW

10/24/2016 8:29 AM

937

Yet also worth noting is the uniqueness of the Wal-Mart case: the case
came before the Court on class certification, not a substantive decision
on the merits, and it was the largest class action ever attempted, alleging
a pattern or practice of discrimination across a massive nationwide com90
pany affecting 1.5 million class members. This means that plaintiffs can,
and do, continue to make use of implicit bias evidence to help create an
inference of discrimination in cases that can be distinguished from the
behemoth Wal-Mart case—for example, where fewer managers are re91
sponsible for discriminatory decisions shaped by the employer entity.
Cases relying on this theory of proof, however, likely need more now; this
once-promising path for remedying second generation discrimination
has been seriously constrained.
3. Stereotype Theory
The third path for litigating modern forms of employment discrimination is to allege disparate treatment under a stereotype theory, by arguing that an adverse employment decision was made because of the opera92
tion of stereotypes associated with a protected class. The legal theory of
sex stereotyping as a form of discrimination originated with early Equal
93
Protection doctrine in the context of constitutional law. In a series of
cases conceived of and litigated by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her role as
the head of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project during the 1970s, the Supreme Court held that, where state or federal law treated men and women differently based on sex stereotypes, such laws violated the Constitu94
tion’s guarantee of Equal Protection. Through these cases, the Court
recognized that differential treatment based on assumptions about how
people will or should behave because of their sex—for example, laws that
entitled women, but not men, to a caregiver tax credit and presumed that

90

See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 520–21 (N.D. Cal.
2012); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 1:10-cv-06950-LBS-JCF, 2012 WL
2912741, at *1–4 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2012); see also supra Part.III.C.1.
92
The term “stereotype” has been attributed to Walter Lippman, who, in 1922,
used print-setting terminology as an analogy to describe fixed “pictures in our heads.”
Anita Bernstein, What’s Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 655, 658 (2013)
(citing Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion 3, 89–90 (1922)). The term was more
precisely defined for the purposes of social psychology in 1954 by Gordon Allport:
“Whether favorable or unfavorable, a stereotype is an exaggerated belief associated
with a category. Its function is to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that
category.” Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 191 (1954).
93
See Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family
Conflicts of Men, 63 Hastings L.J. 1297, 1306–09 (2012); see also Cary Franklin, The
Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83,
120 (2010); Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125
Harv. L. Rev. 1307, 1348–52 (2012).
94
See Bornstein, supra note 93, at 1306–09.
91
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men, not women, should serve as estate administrators—constituted un95
constitutional sex discrimination.
While references to stereotypes appeared in Title VII cases contemporaneously with these developments under Equal Protection law in the
96
1970s, a sex stereotyping theory of liability under Title VII first ap97
peared in the 1989 Supreme Court case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
When plaintiff Ann Hopkins, an outstanding employee who was denied a
promotion to partner, alleged that the denial was motivated at least in
part due to her failure to conform to stereotypes about how she should
appear and behave because she was a woman, the Supreme Court
98
agreed. The Court found evidence that the decision makers criticized
her for being too “macho” and “masculine,” and suggested that, to improve her chances at partnership, she should appear and behave more
“femininely,” constituted evidence of sex stereotyping to support a claim
99
of sex discrimination. “[I]n forbidding employers to discriminate
against individuals because of their sex,” the Court held, “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
100
women resulting from sex stereotypes.” Yet merely holding or even expressing stereotypical beliefs in the workplace did not, alone, violate Title
101
VII, the Court noted. To be actionable, a plaintiff must show that the
employer “actually relied on her gender in making its decision,” which
Hopkins had proven by showing that assessment of her work performance was impermissibly influenced by her failure to conform to sex ste102
reotype.
So defined, stereotype theory is a way to frame disparate treatment
that can reach second generation discrimination by exposing how workplace structures rely on stereotypes associated with protected class status
to disadvantage members of that class. In this way, the legal theory of stereotyping overlaps with, but is distinct from, implicit bias social framework theory. Implicit or cognitive bias is a broad social scientific concept
identifying and documenting how past experiences or opinions shape a
person’s current thought processes without the person’s conscious
103
awareness. It encompasses multiple aspects and sources of bias, of
95

See Bornstein, supra note 93, at 1302–06 (discussing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) and Moritz v. C.I.R., 469 F.2d. 466 (10th Cir. 1972)).
96
See Bernstein, supra note 92, at 681–82 (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
97
490 U.S. 228, 250–55 (1989); see supra Part I.A.
98
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 251.
99
Id. at 235.
100
Id. at 251 (citing City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978); quoting Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198).
101
Id.
102
Id.; see also Bernstein, supra note 92, at 682–83.
103
See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
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104

which stereotypes are just one. Where unrecognized by the holder, stereotypes are a subset of the larger concept of implicit bias; but stereotyping may also be closer to the consciousness of the holder, who believes it
105
to be benign. Thus, while stereotyping evidence may be relevant to both
theories for litigating discrimination under Title VII, their framing of
such evidence varies. Social framework theory posits that, where workplace statistics show discrimination and workplace policies are likely to
activate implicit bias, an employer entity intentionally discriminates by
failing to prevent or correct for the implicit biases of its individual deci106
sion makers. Stereotype theory posits, similarly, that an employer entity
is liable for individual decisions infected by unlawful stereotypes, whether
implicitly or more consciously; but it also exposes how workplaces are de107
signed around norms and cultures that favor certain protected classes.
Implicit bias and social framework concepts most commonly arise in class
cases, while stereotyping most commonly arises in individual cases. But,
as discussed in Part III, below, stereotype theory may offer a framing that
bolsters class cases alleged under class-based implicit bias disparate
108
treatment and disparate impact theories.
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 Psychol. Rev. 4, 4–6 (1995). A general
discussion of implicit or cognitive bias is beyond the scope of this Article. For more
on this topic, see the sources listed supra note 78.
104
See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 103, at 4–6 (identifying and discussing
three key categories of implicit cognition: “attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes”);
Kang, et al., supra note 78, at 1132–35 (describing the difference between explicit,
concealed, and implicit attitudes and stereotypes).
105
See Kang, et al., supra note 78, at 1132–35; Michael Selmi, The Evolution of
Employment Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 Wis.
L. Rev. 937, 978–79 (2014) (“As may be apparent, [implicit bias] theories are also
closely related to the concept of stereotyping; indeed, stereotyping likely explains at
least some significant portion of the IAT [Implicit Association Test] results. There is
extensive literature going back decades on stereotyping, and there are different
forms, some more innocuous than others. At least in one respect stereotyping is an
overbroad group judgment applied to individuals, and today it seems to have its
strongest effect as applied to gender where stereotypes abound.”); Joan C. Williams,
The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination
Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 401, 442 (2003)
(“[C]ognitive bias is a generic term, which includes many situations that involve
stereotyping. Surely commentators cannot mean that stereotyping should not give
rise to liability: the Supreme Court established the relevance of stereotyping evidence
in glass ceiling cases in 1989, and in maternal wall cases in 2003” (citations omitted)).
106
See, e.g., Green, A Structural Approach, supra note 56, at 855.
107
See, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”:
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and
Implicit Bias, 59 Hastings L.J. 1311, 1338–39 (2008) (“When a workplace is designed
around masculine norms, gender stereotypes arise in everyday workplace
interactions: . . . women can and do successfully litigate sex discrimination by using
the stereotypes that arise in everyday interactions as evidence of gender bias.”).
108
See infra Part III.C.
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Since Price Waterhouse, the use of stereotyping to allege disparate
treatment under Title VII has gained prominence, most successfully in
109
second generation cases alleging sex discrimination. Noting its rise, legal scholars tracing the development of the sex stereotype theory have
110
attempted to define its contours. Anita Bernstein has suggested that
U.S. law finds stereotyping unlawful where stereotypes operate as a con111
straint on individual freedom. Thus, while stereotyping is “a technology
of actionable discrimination” and “a mode by which injustice gains effect,” the law would benefit from clarity that stereotyping is unlawful only
112
where it constrains individuals. Kerri Stone has described stereotyping
doctrine as lacking in definition and uniformity, leading to disparate re113
sults in the many cases citing to Price Waterhouse. To remedy this lack of
precision, Stone suggests that courts determine if a stereotype is “in play”
(“voiced or somehow acted upon” as opposed to “offhand”) and, if so, if
there is a “sufficient nexus” between that stereotype and the adverse em114
ployment action. And, despite its expansion of the protected class of
“sex” to include gender identity (and possibly sexual orientation), Kimberly Yuracko has argued that stereotype theory has failed to live up to its
transformative promise of sex neutrality and freedom from gender con115
straints at work. Instead, Yuracko posits, stereotype theory has served
primarily as a burden-shifting mechanism that, for a plaintiff to use suc116
cessfully, risks re-inscribing gender differences.
Indeed, the reach of the stereotype theory has not been universal—
most notably, as Yuracko has documented, in its inability to prohibit
109

See Bernstein, supra note 92, at 681–84, 689 (describing “the rise of
stereotyping as a strong legal claim post-Price Waterhouse, in an era when plaintiffs
fared worse elsewhere in employment law”); Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping,
59 U. Kan. L. Rev. 591, 656 (2011).
110
See Bernstein, supra note 92; Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, supra note 109;
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 161 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 757 (2013).
111
See Bernstein, supra note 92, at 671.
112
Id. at 687, 715–21.
113
Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, supra note 109, at 594, 621.
114
Id. at 634–56.
115
See Yuracko, Soul of a Woman, supra note 110, at 758–62, 770–71. For further
discussion of the application of sex stereotype theory to cases alleging sexual
orientation discrimination, see generally, for example, Zachary R. Herz, Price’s
Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396
(2014); Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title
VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the
Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (2014); William C. Sung, Taking the Fight Back
to Title VII: A Case for Redefining ‘Because of Sex’ to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual
Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL L. REV. 487 (2011); Ann C. McGinley, Erasing
Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 713 (2010). But see infra note 182.
116
See id. at 786–87.
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physical assimilation demands, like sex-differentiated dress and grooming
117
codes. Yet despite its variation and limitations, the potential of using
stereotype theory as a framing device to help plaintiffs prove many types
of second generation discrimination remains largely undiminished. Notably, in Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court did not limit the application
of stereotyping evidence to a particular protected class, yet stereotype
theory has been used primarily to allege discrimination on the basis of
118
sex. And, unlike both disparate impact theory and implicit bias social
framework theory, the U.S. Supreme Court has not weighed in to limit
the stereotype path, despite the fact that several appellate courts have
adapted and expanded its Price Waterhouse decision in significant new
119
ways. Over the past decade, during the same time period in which the
Roberts Court narrowed disparate impact and implicit bias theories (and
120
employment discrimination protections overall), innovative discrimination cases alleging a sex stereotyping theory have gained success in federal district and appellate courts, suggesting a way forward for all modern
claims of discrimination.
II. THE UNIFYING LESSONS OF SEX STEREOTYPING CASES
The unusual success of cases alleging sex stereotyping in the last
decade, during a period in which other popular theories for litigating
second generation discrimination were limited by the Supreme Court,
provides an opportunity for reflection. What about sex stereotyping cases
led to plaintiffs’ successes? Indeed, such cases may be unique in that they
involve more marginalized groups within a protected class for whom ste121
reotyping evidence is still often surprisingly open. This overt treatment
of plaintiffs harkens back to the first generation of antidiscrimination
lawsuits.
Yet caregiver and transgender discrimination cases also push the
boundaries of what constitutes discrimination “because of sex” in new
117

See id. at 788–94; Kimberly A. Yuracko, The Antidiscrimination Paradox: Why Sex
Before Race?, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1–19 (2010); see also, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006).
118
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“By focusing on
Hopkins’ specific proof, . . . we do not suggest a limitation on the possible ways of
proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision”); see
also infra Part III.A.
119
See supra note 27.
120
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
121
For example, one employer in a sex stereotyping case told a transgender
plaintiff that it was “inappropriate,” “unsettling,” and “unnatural” for the plaintiff,
born biologically male, to present as a woman. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1314
(11th Cir. 2011). Another employer told a visibly pregnant woman, “I was going to
put you in charge of that office, but look at you now.” Moore v. Ala. State Univ., 980
F. Supp. 426, 431 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
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and contemporary ways—making them a sort of bridge between first and
second generation forms of discrimination. While the stereotyping evidence may be easier to spot in such cases, the development of the legal
framework applied to this evidence is decidedly modern—and translatable
to cases alleging discrimination on other protected bases.
Two developments in the law stand out: (1) a route for creating an
inference of discrimination without “comparator” evidence, and (2) a
way to include, as stereotyping evidence, evidence that might otherwise
be discounted as “stray remarks.” To date, these advances have not been
broadly applied to employment discrimination law as a whole. This is a
mistake, this Part argues: the social science on bias should be recognized
similarly, regardless of protected class. Sex stereotyping cases provide
valuable insights into the operation of bias in its modern forms that can
provide coherence and continued relevance to all litigation under Title
VII.
A. A Bridge from Comparators to Comparisons
First generation case law suggested that to prove intentional discrimination, an employee plaintiff must point to a similarly situated coworker
outside of the plaintiff’s protected class (i.e., of a different race, sex, national origin) who was treated better than the plaintiff. Over time, such
“comparator” evidence became expected and even required by some
federal courts, posing a challenge for plaintiffs alleging second genera122
tion discrimination, particularly in an era of occupational segregation.
Yet through a series of recent sex stereotyping decisions, the so-called
comparator “requirement” has evolved to allow plaintiffs with stereotyping evidence to create an inference of discrimination even when they
lack comparators.
1. The “Comparator Requirement”
Shortly after the enactment of Title VII, in the 1973 case McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, the U.S. Supreme Court set out its now well-known
three-stage burden-shifting framework for proving a circumstantial case
123
of intentional employment discrimination.
The employee plaintiff
must first establish a rebuttable presumption of discrimination by making
out a four-pronged prima facie case; the burden then shifts in the second
stage to the employer defendant to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse action it took against the plaintiff; and, in the
third stage, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the de124
fendant’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.

122
123
124

See infra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Id. at 802–04.
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In illustrating how to meet this framework, the Court suggested that
comparative evidence could be relevant at both the first and third stages.
In the first stage, to prove his prima facie case of race discrimination in
hiring, the plaintiff must show not only that he (1) was a member of a
protected class (here, an African-American), (2) applied and was qualified for the position, and (3) was not hired, but also that (4) the job re125
mained open to applicants with similar qualifications. And in the third
stage of the burden-shifting framework, comparative evidence could help
prove pretext. Where the defendant in McDonnell Douglas had cited the
plaintiff’s civil rights protests against it as its legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for not hiring the plaintiff, the Court explained that “evidence
that white employees involved in acts . . . of comparable seriousness . . . were nevertheless retained or rehired” would be “[e]specially
126
relevant” to proving pretext.
While suggesting the value of comparative evidence, the Court cautioned, in a footnote, that because facts vary in discrimination cases, the
formulation of the four prongs of the prima facie case “is not necessarily
127
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.” It reiterated
this point several years later in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, noting
that the proof described in McDonnell Douglas “was not intended to be an
inflexible rule,” but rather to establish that, in the prima facie stage, the
plaintiff bears the burden of creating an inference that the defendant’s
128
actions were based on discrimination. The Supreme Court also cited
comparative proof in the 1976 case of McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.: while looking to whether an employee outside of the protected
class was treated better than the plaintiff when both had engaged in
workplace misconduct of “comparable seriousness,” the Court noted that
an inference of discrimination did not require “precise equivalence in
129
culpability.”
Despite the Supreme Court’s caveats, over the next three decades,
lower federal courts interpreted the role of comparative evidence to de130
velop what is now known as the “comparator requirement.” In a num-

125

Id.
Id. at 804.
127
Id. at 802 n.13.
128
Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575–76 (1978) (“[A] Title VII
plaintiff carries the initial burden of showing actions taken by the employer from
which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than
not that such actions were ‘based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.’”
(citing Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977))).
129
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.11 (1976).
130
See Dianne Avery et al., Employment Discrimination Law: Cases and
Materials on Equality in the Workplace 111–13 (8th ed. 2010); Bornstein, supra
note 93, at 1327–33, 1338–39; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120
Yale L.J. 728, 745 (2011); Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated
126
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ber of federal courts, a plaintiff may only succeed in proving the pretext
stage of an employment discrimination case by providing evidence that a
coworker from outside of the relevant protected class (a “comparator”)
was treated better—for example, that a woman alleging that she was denied a promotion because of sex discrimination show that the promotion
went to a man, or that a Latino alleging national origin discrimination
131
prevented his hire show that a white candidate got the job instead. In
several federal courts, this comparator requirement comes even earlier,
as a necessary component for a plaintiff to meet the fourth prong of his
132
first stage prima facie case.
Moreover, in jurisdictions that require comparator evidence, the
mandate that a comparator be “similarly situated” has also proved limiting to plaintiffs. Court interpretations vary as to what makes a given comparator similar enough to the plaintiff to infer discrimination based on the
133
difference in the parties’ protected class status. Yet some courts require
the plaintiff be “nearly identical” to the comparator before the plaintiff
134
will be entitled to an inference of discrimination.
To be sure, other federal courts have properly understood that comparators are one, but not the only, way for a plaintiff to create an inference of discrimination—the Supreme Court’s ultimate purpose in creat135
ing the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Yet for discrimination plaintiffs in
those courts that adhere to the comparator requirement, the ability to
136
provide a convincing comparator can often be determinative.
The comparator requirement is an outdated remnant of first generation discrimination doctrine that fails to recognize how bias operates in
modern workplaces, thus unnecessarily curbing the ability of Title VII to
Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 Mo. L. Rev. 831, 839 (2002); Charles A.
Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 Ala. L. Rev.
191, 203 (2009); Williams & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 1350–52.
131
See Avery et al., supra note 130, at 111–13; Goldberg, supra note 130, at 747
n.49 (citing cases in the 2d, 6th, and 8th Circuits); Sullivan, The Phoenix, supra note
130, at 194, 208 (as cited in Goldberg).
132
Avery et al., supra note 130, at 111–12; Goldberg, supra note 130, at 747 n.48
(citing cases in the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits).
133
Avery et al., supra note 130, at 112–13.
134
Id. at 112–13 (citing Perez v Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 395 F.3d 206, 213
(5th Cir. 2004)).
135
Id.
136
See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 130, at 750 (“In much of discrimination
law . . . comparators have taken on an importance beyond their service as a
potentially useful heuristic for seeing discrimination. They constitute, to many courts,
a threshold requirement of a discrimination claim and, in that sense, part of
discrimination’s very definition. On this view, discrimination occurs only when an
actor has differentiated between two groups of people because of a protected trait,
which means that the absence of a comparator signals the absence of discrimination.”
(footnote omitted)).
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137

redress second generation discrimination. Modern scientific understandings of stereotyping tell us that unlawful biases based on a person’s
sex, race, or national origin may play a role in employment decision re138
gardless of how the decision maker treats other employees. An example
of this phenomenon is the success of a member of a protected class who
is perceived to be, in the words of Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, “racially palatable” (“good black”) rather than “racially salient” (“too
139
black”). If one African-American employee whose appearance or manner seems more “palatable” to the white working culture of the employer
receives a promotion, that should not bar the discrimination claim of another African-American employee whose race is more “salient” (i.e., “too
black”). If one employee is disadvantaged by racial stereotypes, that is
discriminatory, even if others are not.
The comparator requirement also poses a particular problem to redressing unlawful discrimination in an economy marked by steep occupational segregation. A plaintiff who works in a heavily segregated occupation (for example, a dental hygienist who believes she experienced sex
discrimination) may not be able to provide comparator evidence of
someone outside of the protected class who was treated better than she
(in the example, a man) because none exists (in 2015, 96.4% of dental
140
hygienists were women). Yet even in an all-female work environment,
one female employee can experience sex discrimination when she is penalized in relation to gender stereotypes when others are not—for example, if she is perceived as too feminine or nice or, conversely, too masculine or aggressive, to be promoted.
2. Caregiver Discrimination Without Comparators
In a series of cases in which plaintiffs alleged that they were discriminated against on the basis of their family caregiving responsibilities, a
number of courts have exposed the fallacy of the comparator require-

137

See, e.g., id. at 753–72 (detailing the many problems that requiring a
comparator poses for both first and second generation discrimination cases).
138
See, e.g., ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 206–
44 (1977) (discussing “tokenism”); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black
Woman, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 719–28 (2001) (discussing intra-group
differences and “identity performance”); see also, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561
F.3d 38, 42 n.4 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[D]iscrimination against one employee cannot be
remedied solely by nondiscrimination against another employee in that same group”
(citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–54 (1982), Brown v. Henderson, 257
F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir.2001)).
139
See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Acting White?
Rethinking Race in “Post-Racial” America 1–20 (2013) (describing and
documenting the idea of racial performance and “Working Identity”).
140
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Household Data Ann. Averages tbl.11
(2015), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.pdf. (Employed persons by detailed
occupation, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity).
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ment, holding clearly that a plaintiff alleging sex stereotyping need not
provide evidence of a comparator to create an inference of discrimina141
tion. The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota held that a
plaintiff—a mother who was told that mothers should “do the right
thing” and stay home—could create an inference of sex discrimination
without providing comparator evidence because an employer’s “veiled
assertion that mothers . . . are insufficiently devoted to work, or that work
and motherhood are incompatible” is inherently “gender-based” treat142
ment, thus “properly addressed under Title VII.” Another federal district court in Illinois allowed an inference of discrimination despite the
lack of a comparator when the plaintiff was denied a traveling sales position for which she applied based on the assumption that, as a new moth143
er, she would not want to travel. The Seventh Circuit held similarly in
two cases—one in which a new mother was fired and her employer sug144
gested it would give her more time at home with her children, and another in which a mother who specifically sought out a promotion she
knew required her to relocate was passed over on the assumption that
145
she would not want to move her family. In each of these cases, the
court found that the plaintiff’s allegation that the employment decision
was infected by gender stereotypes was sufficient to create an inference of
146
discrimination regardless of comparator evidence.

141

See Bornstein, supra note 93, at 1327–30, 1327 n.205; Goldberg, supra note
130, at 799, 799 n.236; Williams & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 1349–52; see also
Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, supra note 109, at 639. Of course, misapplication of the
comparator requirement occurs in sex discrimination cases as well; for a discussion of
courts misapplying it to men alleging sex stereotyping claims, see Bornstein, supra
note 93, at 1338–43.
142
Plaetzer v. Borton Auto., Inc., No. Civ.02–3089 JRT/JSM, 2004 WL 2066770, at
*1, *6 n.3 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2004).
143
See Stern v. Cintas Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 841, 853, 862–65 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
144
See Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 1999).
145
See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004).
146
For additional cases so holding, see also Bornstein, supra note 93, at 1327
n.205 (citing Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 583 (5th Cir. 2003) (involving an
employer who reacted angrily to the plaintiff’s pregnancy); Gorski v. N.H. Dep’t of
Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 474 (1st Cir. 2002) (involving an employer who commented
derogatorily about the plaintiff’s pregnancy); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R.
Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2000) (involving an employer who
implied that the plaintiff could not manage both a job and a family); Troy v. Bay State
Comput. Grp., Inc., 141 F.3d 378, 380–81 (1st Cir. 1998) (involving an employer who
suggested that the plaintiff was unable to perform her job due to her pregnancy);
Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1990) (involving an employer
who questioned an applicant about her plans to get pregnant based on a desire not to
hire a woman who would get pregnant and quit); Coble v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No.
6, 682 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1982) (involving an employer who implied that the
plaintiff was less available and dedicated to the job because she had a family)).
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A landmark decision by the Second Circuit, in the 2004 case Back v.
Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District, provides an example of a sex
stereotyping plaintiff succeeding without a comparator in a field impact147
ed by occupational segregation. The plaintiff was a well-performing
school psychologist who, after she had a child, experienced declining
performance evaluations, resulting in her unexpectedly being denied
148
tenure. The court rejected the defendant school’s argument that she
should lose on summary judgment unless she could produce evidence of
149
“similarly situated men” that the school had treated better than her.
Requiring a male comparator may have posed a particular challenge as
the plaintiff was the only school psychologist and 85% of the school’s
150
teachers were women, 71% of whom were mothers. The court held
that, while comparative evidence may have been helpful, it was not re151
quired: “what matters is how [plaintiff] Back was treated.” According to
the court, “stereotypical remarks about the incompatibility of motherhood and employment” made by the female decision makers who denied
her tenure was evidence enough that “‘gender played a part’ in [the]
152
employment decision.” Thus, the court held, “stereotyping of women
as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an impermis153
sible, sex-based motive.”
In an important statement about the role of comparative evidence in
proving discrimination, the EEOC highlighted this development in Enforcement Guidance it issued on the topic of caregiver discrimination in
154
2007. Citing Back and other sex stereotyping cases related to family responsibilities, the Guidance explained that, when proving intentional sex
discrimination using circumstantial evidence, “while comparative evidence is often useful”—in this context, “evidence showing more favorable treatment of male caregivers than female caregivers”—it is only one
type of evidence from which an inference of discrimination may be
155
drawn and is “not necessary to establish a violation.” In summarizing
case law on caregiver discrimination and articulating its own internal position on proof required, the EEOC stated clearly that evidence of unlaw147

Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 126 (2d Cir.

2004).
148

Id. at 114–16.
Id. at 117–22.
150
Id. at 122. While disregarding the necessity of comparative evidence, the court
also noted that the proper comparison would be to school administrators, not all
teachers. Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 1352; Enforcement Guidance, supra
note 29.
155
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 29.
149
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ful stereotyping “may support an inference of discrimination even absent
156
comparative evidence about the treatment of men with children.”
Two years later, in its 2009 decision in Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., the
First Circuit showed how far this advance could go, upholding a plaintiff’s case at summary judgment despite the defendant employer’s evidence of arguably an anti-comparator: the person who received the promotion for which the plaintiff, a mother alleging sex discrimination, was
157
passed over was also a mother. The court held that the plaintiff, an outstanding employee with four children—6-year old triplets and an 11-year
old—could create an inference of discrimination based on her superior
qualifications and statements by decision makers evincing concern about
158
her competing work and family responsibilities. The court was not persuaded by the fact that the person promoted over the plaintiff was the
mother of a 9- and a 14-year old, noting that “the stereotype that [the
plaintiff] complains of would arguably be more strongly held as to a
mother of four children, three of whom were only six-years old, than as
159
to a mother of two older children.” Moreover, the court noted, not discriminating against one member of a protected class does not excuse discrimination against another given that Title VII requires a focus on the
160
treatment of employees as individuals.
Most compellingly, the Supreme Court itself weighed in again about
the nature of comparative evidence in a recent caregiver discrimination
161
case—its 2015 decision in Young v. UPS. In Young, the Court considered
the scope of accommodations required by Title VII’s mandate, as
162
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). The PDA is the
one piece of Title VII that does, in fact, require a comparison, yet not a
comparator. To establish a violation, a pregnant employee must show that
the employer failed to treat her “the same . . . as” other nonpregnant
163
employees who were similar in their “ability or inability to work.” While
the plaintiff in Young did not expressly plead her case using a sex stereotyping theory, she alleged that stereotypes about pregnant women’s abilities to work and need for accommodations played a role in the defendant
employer’s decision to exclude pregnant women from a policy allowing
164
other workers access to light duty positions.
156

Id.
Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 n.4 (1st Cir. 2009).
158
See id. at 46.
159
Id. at 42 n.4.
160
See id.
161
135 S. Ct. 1338, 1343–44 (2015).
162
Id. at 1345.
163
Id.
164
See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. at 24 (D. Md. 2010) (No. DKC
08 CV 2586), 2010 WL 10839226.
157
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In Young, when articulating what a plaintiff alleging pregnancy discrimination must show, the Court once again revisited the framework of
proof for intentional discrimination:
[Under] the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . an individual
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by “showing actions taken
by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain
unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were
based on a discriminatory criterion” . . . . The burden of making
this showing is “not onerous” . . . . Neither does it require the plaintiff to
show that those whom the employer favored and those whom the employer dis165
favored were similar in all but the protected ways.

Tellingly, even in the context of a claim under Title VII that requires
comparisons—that is, that seeks an answer to the question of whether
pregnant employees were treated “the same . . . as” other employees—the
Court made clear that there was no comparator “requirement” and that,
if a comparator was offered, he or she need not be similar to the plaintiff
166
“in all . . . ways.”
The Court’s statement in Young is the clearest statement yet that federal courts should no longer consider the lack of comparator evidence
fatal to a discrimination case. Yet it, too, risks being overlooked because it
was made in the context of a caregiver discrimination case. Indeed, the
Court articulated that a portion of the Young decision was limited to the
context of pregnancy discrimination: after making its generally applicable statement about McDonnell Douglas proof, the Court went on to spell
out the prongs of a prima facie case of denial of pregnancy accommodations, noting that the prongs as they described them are “limited to the
167
Pregnancy Discrimination Act context.” In this context, the Court described the fourth prong of the prima facie case, whereby the plaintiff
must create an inference of discrimination, as requiring evidence that
the defendant accommodated any others “similar in their ability or ina168
bility to work.” Notably, the Court said nothing at all about the workers
being “similarly situated” in general; the comparison is limited solely to
pregnant and nonpregnant employees’ physical work capabilities. Moreover, while the Court stated that this prong, as defined, is limited to cases
of pregnancy—as opposed to all claims of—discrimination, the Court also described it as “consistent with our longstanding rule that a plaintiff
can use circumstantial proof to rebut an employer’s” case in a discrimina169
tion lawsuit under Title VII. Thus, the Court’s general discussion in

165
166
167
168
169

Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353–54 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
See id. at 1345, 1353–34.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1355.
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Young of McDonnell Douglas proof—which made no mention of a compar170
ator requirement—applies regardless of protected class.
3. Transgender Discrimination Per Se
While sex stereotyping cases alleging caregiver discrimination helped
establish that comparator evidence is no longer required to infer discrimination, sex stereotyping cases alleging transgender status discrimination
provide examples of this legal advance applied.
The area of transgender status discrimination has evolved rapidly in
the last decade. Early cases brought by gender “non-conformers” alleging
discrimination were rejected as beyond the reach of Title VII’s prohibitions against sex discrimination. Cases alleging discrimination on the basis of gender identity were lumped in with those alleging sexual orientation discrimination, and both were held to be outside of Title VII’s
171
protected class of “sex.” This rationale changed after the Supreme
Court’s recognition of stereotyping in the 1989 Price Waterhouse case, in
which the Court held that evidence that the plaintiff’s failure to conform
to a feminine gender stereotype played a role in her being denied a
172
promotion could create an inference of sex discrimination. Between
1997 and 2002, based on Price Waterhouse and another Supreme Court
173
decision—Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., holding that a heterosexual man who was sexually harassed by other men could sue under
Title VII—a handful of circuit court cases laid the groundwork for

170

See id. at 1353–54. Still, despite the limited comparison the Court described in
the pregnancy accommodation context, even the EEOC’s own Enforcement
Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination, revised in the wake of the Young decision,
muddles the issue. Before explaining the Court’s description of a prima facie case for
pregnancy accommodation, the EEOC notes that, to make out a prima facie case
using circumstantial evidence, “a plaintiff must produce evidence that a similarly
situated worker was treated differently or more favorably than the pregnant worker.”
Enforcement Guidance: Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues, U.S. Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n (June 25, 2015), http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/
pregnancy_guidance.cfm#IC (emphasis added). This mistakes the Court’s definition
in Young of the fourth prong of the prima facie case for pregnancy discrimination,
which requires that the comparative evidence relate only to whether another
employee was similar in their physical work capabilities—and requires nothing at all
about the workers being generally “similarly situated.” Unfortunately, this shows just
how long of a shadow has been cast by the comparator requirement developed in the
context of first generation discrimination case law, despite the Court’s repeated
statements that no such evidence is required.
171
See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608
F.2d 327 (9th Cir.1979); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1977); see also Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing the
abrogation of these cases by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
172
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 250–55; supra Part I.B.3.
173
523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
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174

transgender discrimination claims. These early cases permitted men
harassed for being “too effeminate” to allege sexual harassment under
Title VII, even when the source of the harassment was their homosexuality, and despite many courts’ views that sexual orientation discrimination
175
was excluded from the protected class of “sex.”
Then, in a germinal 2004 decision, Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth
Circuit held that a fire lieutenant who was suspended because of her stated gender identity as “transsexual” could rely on a Price Waterhouse stereotyping theory to state a claim under Title VII’s prohibition for sex dis176
crimination. To do so, the circuit court rejected the district court’s
characterization that the plaintiff’s reliance on sex stereotyping was
merely “an end run around [the] ‘real’ claim” of status discrimination
“based upon . . . transsexuality,” overturning its holding that “Title VII
does not prohibit discrimination based on an individual’s transsexual177
ism.” This, the circuit court held, was an incorrect interpretation of the
law relying on outdated pre-Price Waterhouse decisions, an error of law because that rationale had been “eviscerated” by the Supreme Court in Price
178
Waterhouse:
By holding that Title VII protected a woman who failed to conform
to social expectations concerning how a woman should look and
behave, the Supreme Court established that Title VII’s reference to
“sex” encompasses both the biological differences between men
and women, and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination
179
based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.

Applying this interpretation, the Sixth Circuit held that Smith, who alleged it was her failure to conform to stereotypes about how a person
born biologically male should look and act that “was the driving force
behind” the employer’s adverse actions, had stated a cognizable claim of
180
sex discrimination under Title VII. Since the Smith decision, courts of
appeals in the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and federal district courts in at least 10 states and the District of Columbia have held
similarly that discrimination on the basis of a gender identity constitutes

174

See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002); Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d
1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), rev’d on
other grounds, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
175
See Rene, 305 F.3d at 1064–65; Nichols, 256 F.3d at 869, 874–75; Schwenk, 204
F.3d at 1192–93; Doe, 119 F.3d at 566, 580–81.
176
Smith, 378 F.3d at 573.
177
Id. at 571.
178
Id. at 573–74.
179
Id. at 573.
180
Id. at 572.
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181

sex discrimination under Title VII. In 2012, the EEOC also formally
182
stated its adoption of this position.
As the sex stereotyping theory of transgender discrimination is currently recognized, discriminating against an employee because of her
gender identity or transgender status is sex discrimination per se, regard183
less of any comparator or comparative evidence. Because the adverse
employment action in these cases is motivated by the mere fact of the
plaintiff’s failure to conform to expected gender stereotypes, the plaintiff
may create an inference of sex discrimination based on stereotyping evidence alone. Thus, transgender discrimination cases provide a body of

181

See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1314, 1316–20 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
holdings in the 1st, 6th, and 9th Circuits, and in district courts in D.C., N.Y, Pa., and
Tex.); Examples of Court Decisions Supporting Coverage of LGBT-Related Discrimination
Under Title VII, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/newsroom/wysk/lgbt_examples_decisions.cfm (citing holdings in the 1st, 6th,
9th, and 11th Circuits and in district courts in Mich., N.C., Ala., Md., Minn., Tex., Pa.,
N.Y., and Ind.).
182
See Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, *7–8 (U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n Apr. 20, 2012); What You Should Know About EEOC and the Enforcement
Protections for LGBT Workers, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers
.cfm. Note that, in 2015, the EEOC formally stated its position that discrimination because of an employee’s sexual orientation is also impermissible sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII. See id; Baldwin v. Dep't of Transportation, Appeal No.
0120133080, *6 (U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n July 15, 2015) (“[W]e conclude that sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based consideration,’ and an allegation of discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex
discrimination under Title VII”). To date, a few federal courts have been receptive to
this position, see Baldwin, supra, at *7, 10 (citing cases in U.S. district courts in Colo.,
Conn., D.C., Mass., Or., and W. Wash.). Yet many more have expressly rejected this
position as “bootstrapping” the separate category of “sexual orientation” onto the
protected category of “sex,” even after Price Waterhouse and Smith. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy
Tech Comm. Coll., 2016 WL 4039703, *2–4 (7th Cir. July 28, 2016) (reaffirming the
7th Circuit’s “unequivocal . . . holding that Title VII does not redress sexual orientation discrimination,” even after the EEOC’s Baldwin decision, and citing to similar
holdings in the D.C., 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits). For this reason,
separate discussion of cases alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
(as opposed to transgender status/gender identity) under a sex stereotyping theory is
beyond the scope of this Article. To the extent that sexual orientation discrimination
cases may succeed based on a similar sex stereotyping rationale, however, the lessons
for employment discrimination law would be the same. For a discussion of applying
Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory to cover claims of sexual orientation discrimination, see the sources listed in note 114, supra.
183
See Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316 (citing Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se:
Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 563 (2007); Taylor Flinn,
Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex
and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 392 (2001)). But see Etsitty v.
Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007) (refusing to hold that
“transsexuals” as a class are protected under “sex”).
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precedent in which federal courts have routinely allowed plaintiffs’ cases
to survive past the pleading stage despite providing little or no comparative evidence.
Several cases provide examples. While the Sixth Circuit in Smith described the plaintiff’s prima facie case in the traditional way, listing the
fourth prong of the prima facie case as a showing that the plaintiff “was
treated differently from similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class,” the court nevertheless held that the plaintiff had satisfied
this prong with proof that “he would not have been treated differently,
on account of his non-masculine behavior . . . had he been a woman in184
stead of a man.” In another Sixth Circuit case, Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, the court responded to the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff,
alleging sex discrimination in promotion, had failed to produce required
evidence that “other employees of similar qualifications who were not
members of the protected class received promotions” with a broad view
185
of the necessary evidence. The plaintiff “need not demonstrate an exact correlation with [an] employee receiving more favorable treatment,”
the court held; it was enough that the plaintiff was the only employee in a
seven-year period to not make it through the probationary period, in186
cluding one employee who performed worse.
After discussing both Smith and Barnes, a federal district court in
Michigan held, with no discussion of comparative evidence, that when a
plaintiff who announced a gender transition was told that what the plaintiff “was ‘proposing to do’ was unacceptable” and then fired, the allegation that “failure to conform to sex stereotypes was the driving force behind” the employer’s firing alone was enough to survive a motion to
187
dismiss. Likewise, after identifying that the prima facie case required a
plaintiff to show that “her employer treated similarly situated employees
outside her class more favorably” or that, when she was fired, “she was
replaced by someone outside her protected class,” a Georgia federal district court found that the employer’s statements that “he was very nervous
about [the plaintiff’s] situation,” “did not want her to wear a dress to
work,” and was concerned about the impact on coworkers and the business were “adequate to permit an inference of discrimination,” with no
188
mention of a comparator.
Transgender discrimination cases provide examples of the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework as it was made

184

Smith, 378 F.3d at 570.
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 736–37 (6th Cir. 2005).
186
Id.
187
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.
100 F. Supp. 3d 594, 603 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
188
Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1197–98 (N.D. Ga.
2014) (citation omitted).
185
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clear in the caregiver discrimination context: a plaintiff with stereotyping
evidence need not provide comparator evidence to create an inference
of impermissible discrimination.
B. A Bridge from Stray Remarks to Stereotyping Evidence
The second development from recent sex stereotyping cases that can
help modernize antidiscrimination doctrine as a whole is on what constitutes “direct evidence” of intentional discrimination and, alternatively,
what evidence can be disregarded as mere “stray remarks.” First generation case law established that a plaintiff may prove intentional discrimination through either direct evidence, which establishes a discriminatory
motive without the need for inferences, or circumstantial evidence,
which requires the plaintiff to follow the McDonnell Douglas framework to
189
create an inference of discrimination. By the 1990s, despite the strong
persistence of cultural stereotypes about sex, race, and other protected
classes, direct statements by an employer that a protected class motivated
its adverse employment decision were virtually nonexistent. Courts began
to distinguish statements evincing stereotypical beliefs from those that
served as direct evidence of discrimination, referring to the former as
190
“stray remarks.” Since then, the so-called “stray remarks doctrine” has
gained strength and influence, allowing courts to discount the evidentiary value of such statements. Yet given the more subtle and structural
nature of bias today, any evidence that exposes hidden bias should not be
discounted at the pleading stage. Innovative cases alleging sex stereotyping have helped break down these categories, broadening what may be
useful stereotyping evidence and revisiting what constitutes “direct evidence” of discrimination.
1. Direct Evidence and the “Stray Remarks” Doctrine
In the series of cases establishing how to prove intentional discrimination under Title VII, the Supreme Court created two different routes
of proof based on the type of evidence a plaintiff was able to proffer, di191
rect or circumstantial. These two routes continue to shape Title VII litigation today. If, as in the vast majority of cases, the plaintiff employee
has no “smoking gun” but only circumstantial evidence of discrimination
by the defendant employer, the plaintiff proceeds under the three-part
192
burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas framework described previously. If,
however, the plaintiff can provide direct evidence of discrimination, the

189

See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); Brown v. E.
Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993); Earley v. Champion Int’l
Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081–82 (11th Cir. 1990).
190
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277.
191
See supra Part II.A.1.
192
See id.
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burden of persuasion shifts immediately to the defendant to prove that
discriminatory animus was not the motivation for the adverse employment action being challenged because it would have taken the same ac193
tion regardless of the plaintiff’s protected class. The Court defines “direct evidence” as that which proves discrimination standing by itself,
without a factfinder needing to draw an inference or make a presump194
tion that discrimination motivated the decision. So defined, direct evidence requires essentially an admission by the employer that the plaintiff’s protected class motivated its decision—for example, that the
employer did not want to hire a woman or promote an African Ameri195
can. Thus the usefulness of the direct evidence route of proving intentional discrimination became virtually nonexistent almost as soon as the
Court articulated it: no thinking employer aware that Title VII exists
would make such an admission.
The direct evidence method of proof was revived, however, by the
emergence of the stereotype theory in the Supreme Court’s 1989 deci196
sion in Price Waterhouse. As described previously, in Price Waterhouse, the
Court held that evidence that an employer relied on impermissible sex
stereotypes in making an adverse employment decision against the plain197
tiff could constitute evidence of discrimination “‘because of’ sex.” In a
separate concurrence, Justice O’Connor expressed her opinion that
plaintiff Ann Hopkins had provided direct evidence of sex discrimina198
tion. Hopkins had showed that the decision makers who denied her a
promotion did so at least in part based on their belief that she was too
199
“macho” and should walk, talk, and dress “more femininely.” As Justice
O’Connor saw it,
It is as if Ann Hopkins were sitting in the hall outside the room
where partnership decisions were being made . . . [and] heard several of [the decisionmakers] make sexist remarks in discussing her
suitability for partnership. [And a]s the decisionmakers exited the
room, she was told by one of those privy to the decisionmaking pro-

193

See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–56; see also, e.g., Brown, 989 F.2d at 861.
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–56; see also, e.g., Earley, 907 F.2d at 1081–82.
195
See, e.g., Earley, 907 F.2d at 1081–82 (holding that “[o]nly the most blatant
remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate” suffice as direct
evidence) (quoting Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 (1989)).
196
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–56.
197
Id. at 241; see also supra Part I.B.3.
198
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271–75 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also McGinley, supra note 78, at 472 (describing how, under Price
Waterhouse, “overt stereotyping by a decision maker [is] virtually the equivalent of
direct evidence of discrimination”).
199
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
194
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cess that her gender was a major reason for the rejection of her
200
partnership bid.

While essential to Justice O’Connor’s agreement with the Court’s holding in favor of Hopkins (due to the mixed-motives nature of the case),
this finding was not part of the plurality’s opinion, which held that Hop201
kins could prevail even with circumstantial evidence. Still, Justice
O’Connor helped lay the groundwork to establish that stereotyping evidence could, in certain circumstances, serve as direct evidence of discrimination.
Yet in the very same concurrence, Justice O’Connor also noted that,
to constitute direct evidence and justify shifting the burden of persuasion
of nondiscrimination to the employer, such stereotyping had to be close202
ly tied to the adverse employment decision and not be “stray remarks.”
Neither, she stated, could “statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process” constitute
enough direct evidence to shift the burden similarly—for example, a
“perfectly neutral and nondiscriminatory . . . mere reference to ‘a lady
203
candidate,’” she wrote, would not be enough.
With this statement, Justice O’Connor sparked what has come to be
known as the “stray remarks doctrine,” whereby evidence that reveals impermissibly stereotypical beliefs may nonetheless be discounted for evi204
dentiary purposes. As it has been interpreted by many federal courts,
the stray remarks doctrine holds that express statements about the plaintiff’s protected class do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination
when made outside the context of the relevant adverse employment decision (usually temporally) or by someone other than the relevant decision
maker, or even if the remarks are considered to be too few or “isolat205
ed.” Yet as scholars and even some jurists have noted, the doctrine has
gone far beyond the initial suggestion that stray remarks are not direct ev206
idence. Where such indirect evidence may not shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant, it should still serve as probative circumstantial

200

Id. at 272–73 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 241–42 (majority opinion).
202
Id. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
203
Id.
204
See Kerri Lynn Stone, Proving an Employer’s Intent: Disparate Treatment
Discrimination and the Stray Remarks Doctrine after Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 219 (2002); Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of
the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 Mo. L. Rev. 149 (2012).
205
See Stone, Proving an Employer’s Intent, supra note 204, at 242–43; see also, e.g.,
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998); Jones v.
Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323 n.11 (11th Cir. 1998); Bevill v.
UAB Walker Coll., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1272 n.10 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
206
See Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 150.
201
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evidence from which the factfinder may infer discrimination to shift the
burden of production in the McDonnell Douglas framework.
To be sure, application of the stray remarks doctrine has not been
207
consistent, and a number of courts have signaled its lessening value. A
decade after Price Waterhouse, in 2000, the Supreme Court weighed in on
208
the issue in the age discrimination case Reeves v. Sanderson. While the
Court criticized the appellate court’s evaluation of the plaintiff’s evidence because it discounted the value of statements evincing age-related
209
stereotypes, it did not clearly reject the stray remarks doctrine outright.
After Reeves, some federal courts revisited and distanced themselves from
210
the doctrine; nevertheless, in most courts, the concept of stray remarks
211
persists to devalue potentially valuable evidence today.
As a result, in some cases involving evidence of impermissible stereotyping, particularly sex stereotyping cases of women perceived to be “too
masculine” like Ann Hopkins, indirect stereotyping evidence has still
212
helped create a circumstantial inference of discrimination. Yet in too
many others, particularly those involving racial stereotypes, the stray remarks doctrine continues to be misapplied to discount evidence that may
expose hidden bias—often a key factor in litigating second generation
213
discrimination.
2. Caregiver Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence
In the context of recent cases alleging caregiver discrimination,
plaintiffs have been more successful in converting what might otherwise
be considered “stray remarks” into valuable circumstantial evidence from
which to infer discrimination. By including a stereotype theory argument
in their intentional disparate treatment claims, caregivers have broadened the lens of what is probative of discrimination, creating a wider net
of relevant stereotyping evidence. Also, because at the core of unlawful
sex stereotypes about caregivers is the idea that being a mother (or active, thus “effeminate” father) is incompatible with being a good work214
er, even statements made outside of the temporal proximity of an ad207

See id. at 190; Stone, Proving an Employer’s Intent, supra note 204, at 246–47.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
209
See Stone, Proving an Employer’s Intent, supra note 204, at 251; Stone, Taking in
Strays, supra note 204, at 171.
210
See Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 172–73.
211
See id.; Stone, Proving an Employer’s Intent, supra note 204, at 252.
212
See Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 175–77.
213
See id. at 182–83; see also Catherine Albiston, Kathryn Burkett Dickson,
Charlotte Fishman & Leslie F. Levy, Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family
Responsibilities Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59 Hastings L.J. 1285, 1293–95
(2008) (discussing how so called “stray remarks” actually “may provide a ‘glimpse’ or
a ‘window’ into the true, but partially repressed, attitudes” of the employer).
214
Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and
What to Do About It 65–70 (2000) (describing the “ideal worker” norm).
208
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verse employment decision still relate to a plaintiff’s suitability for the job,
which allows courts to view them as not “stray.”
Several cases in which plaintiffs allege sex discrimination based on
their family caregiving responsibilities provide examples. In its holding,
in Back v. Hastings on Hudson School District, that a caregiver alleging sex
discrimination under a sex stereotyping theory need not provide comparator evidence, the Second Circuit also addressed the notion of stray
215
remarks. When overturning the district court’s grant of summary
judgment against the plaintiff, the court of appeals relied on evidence of
alleged statements made by supervisors over the course of a year asking
the plaintiff, a new mother, to space out her childbearing, suggesting
“that this was perhaps not the job . . . for her if she had ‘little ones,’” and
216
questioning her continued commitment to work. All of this was relevant stereotyping evidence about the plaintiff’s “inability to combine
work and motherhood” that could create an inference of discrimination—evidence that “[t]he district court [had] inaccurately characterized
217
as ‘stray remarks.’”
In another case, the Fifth Circuit overturned a district court’s judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant employer in a sex discrimination case brought by an employee who was terminated while
218
pregnant. In doing so, the court rejected the district court’s assessment
that a supervisor’s purported statement that “she had a business to run
and could not handle having a pregnant woman in the office” was “nothing more than stray remarks” because the supervisor was not the ultimate
219
decision maker. Likewise, in a sex discrimination case brought by a
mother who was fired the day before her probationary period of employment was to end, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s charac220
terization of key sex stereotyping evidence as “stray.” Instead, the court
of appeals held, evidence that her supervisors questioned her “ability to
balance . . . work and parental responsibilities” should she have another
child, and comments made in the context of hiring other employees that
the company “preferred unmarried, childless women because they would
give 150% to the job” were valid circumstantial evidence and not, as the
district court had held, “‘stray remarks,’ insufficient to enable a jury to
221
conclude . . . pretext.” Indeed, the plaintiff could even “point[] to
215

2004).
216

Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 119, 124 n.12.
218
See Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 612 (5th
Cir. 2007).
219
Id. at 607.
220
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir.
2000).
221
Id. at 51, 55.
217
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comments made by others . . . that illustrate a discriminatory attitude in
the company as a whole” such as comments regarding “the company’s
222
treatment of female employees with children.” While none of these
statements proved discrimination alone, the court of appeals held, a factfinder “could reasonably rely upon” all of this stereotyping evidence to
223
infer discrimination.
Even a statement open to multiple interpretations may be found not
stray when it could be an expression of “benevolent” stereotyping—
seemingly well-meaning stereotyping that nevertheless redounds to the
224
detriment of the employee being stereotyped. In Chadwick v. Wellpoint,
when holding that the plaintiff had enough evidence to survive summary
judgment despite the fact that another mother received the promotion
she was denied, the First Circuit highlighted a general statement made
several months prior to the promotion decision (albeit by a decision
225
maker): “Oh my—I did not know you had triplets. Bless you!” The
226
court could have disregarded this statement as stray. Instead, it found
the statement relevant to the strength of the sex stereotypes against the
plaintiff, essential to the plaintiff’s ability to create an inference of discrimination despite comparative evidence that favored the employer
227
(that the promotion went to another mother).
By including a stereotyping frame that ties stereotypes related to the
protected class “because of sex” to a general suitability for work, caregiver
discrimination cases have helped expand the narrow lens of the “stray
remarks” doctrine. Caregiver discrimination cases show that courts can
and should stop discounting the value of evidence of stereotypical thinking more broadly in the workplace. Instead, these cases show, such proof
is useful stereotyping evidence that helps shine a light on hidden second
generation discrimination.
3. Transgender Discrimination and Direct Evidence of Stereotyping
In the context of cases alleging transgender discrimination, courts
have not only rejected the characterization of stereotyping evidence as
“stray remarks,” but—to the contrary—have held that such evidence may
provide direct evidence of intentional discrimination against transgender
222

Id. at 55–56.
Id. at 56.
224
See, e.g., Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory:
Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 70 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 491
(1996).
225
Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2009).
226
See id. at 47 n.10. The district court had gone even further, finding the
statement to be “a friendly exclamation”; the appellate court disagreed, believing it
“suggest[ed] pity rather than respect.” Id.
227
See id. at 42–43 n.4 (noting that “the stereotype that [the plaintiff] complains
of would arguably be more strongly held as to a mother of four children, three of
whom were only six years old, than as to a mother of two older children”).
223
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employees. As described previously, a plaintiff who can provide direct evidence need not prove a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas
framework; the direct evidence alone establishes a discriminatory motive,
228
shifting the burden immediately to the defendant to justify its behavior.
Not only does direct evidence remove a significant procedural hurdle for
the plaintiff, but the characterization of the plaintiff’s proof as direct evidence makes it less likely that the defendant will be able to persuade a
229
factfinder that its motives were nondiscriminatory.
Cases in which plaintiffs allege sex discrimination based on their
transgender status demonstrate courts’ rejection of the stray remarks
doctrine in the transgender discrimination context. In Glenn v. Brumby,
the Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of the plaintiff’s case in the usual
way, by stating the rule that “[a] plaintiff can show discriminatory intent
230
through direct or circumstantial evidence.” Yet instead of moving on to
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and the prima facie
case, the court explained that, where a transgender plaintiff was fired because of the employer’s belief that it was “inappropriate,” “unsettling,”
and “unnatural” for the plaintiff, born biologically male, to present as a
231
woman, the decision was based on “the sheer fact of the transition.” As
such, the plaintiff had provided “ample direct evidence” of sex discrimina232
tion such that a Title VII analysis “would end [t]here.”
Similarly, a Texas federal district court described how evidence that
a decision to rescind an employment offer from an applicant because she
presented herself as female during the interview process but was later
discovered to be born a biological male could constitute direct evidence
233
of sex discrimination. The court explained that rescinding the job offer
due to what the employer described as the plaintiff’s “misrepresentation”
during the interview process could evince animus against the plaintiff for
“inconsisten[cy] with . . . preconceived notions of what a male should
234
look and act like.” This, the court explained, “qualifies as direct evidence” because it “directly links the adverse employment action at issue
with the alleged unlawfully discriminatory motive”—here, plaintiff’s fail-

228

See supra Part II.B.1.
See id.
230
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011).
231
Id. at 1314, 1321.
232
Id. at 1321 (emphasis added). Because this case was brought by a public
employee alleging a constitutional violation of equal protection under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, rather than under Title VII, the court continued on, holding similarly under
equal protection. The cited portion of its analysis is applicable to Title VII cases. See
id.; Lautermilch v. Findlay City Schs., 314 F.3d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 2003).
233
Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653 (S.D.
Tex. 2008).
234
Id. at 662.
229
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235

ure to conform to gender stereotypes. Despite the defendant’s explanation that it was the dishonesty behind the “misrepresentation” and not
the plaintiff’s transgender status that motivated its decision, the court
held that the factual question regarding direct evidence was enough for
236
plaintiff to survive defendant’s challenge on summary judgment.
Of course, to be considered direct evidence, bias based on a plaintiff’s failure to conform to gender stereotypes must still be linked to the
adverse employment decision such that discriminatory motive is clear
without the need for an inference. Thus, a Georgia federal district court
held that an employer’s statements during a meeting that he “did not
want [plaintiff] to wear a dress to work” and that he was “very nervous”
about the plaintiff’s gender transition and its potential effects on the
business did not amount to direct evidence of discrimination when the
237
plaintiff was terminated two months later. While the court agreed that
the statements “reflect[ed] a discriminatory attitude,” they were not
made contemporaneously or in connection with the termination decision; the factfinder would still have to make “an inferential leap between
238
fact and conclusion,” so the statements were not direct evidence. But
tellingly, the statements were allowed to stand as circumstantial evidence
from which one could infer sex discrimination—the statements were not
discounted or excluded as stray remarks irrelevant to the employer’s mo239
tivations.
The formulation of transgender discrimination as sex discrimination
per se provides a context that may be uniquely likely to generate direct
stereotyping evidence of discrimination. Still, the fact that at least some
federal courts have understood that reliance on stereotypes can constitute direct evidence represents a step toward the recognition of modern
forms of unlawful bias. Echoing Justice O’Connor’s perspective in her
240
Price Waterhouse concurrence, courts in transgender discrimination cases have now clearly held that evidence that an employer relied directly on
stereotypes related to a protected class—not just the protected class itself—is
enough to constitute direct evidence of discrimination.

235

Id.
Id. at 662–63. Note, however, that the court also denied plaintiff’s crossmotion for summary judgment, due to open questions of material fact regarding the
interpretation of defendant’s explanation. Id.
237
Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1192–98 (N.D. Ga.
2014).
238
Id.
239
Id. at 1197; supra Part II.B.1.
240
See supra Part II.B.1.
236
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C. Identifying Universal Patterns of Stereotyping at Work
In addition to providing concrete doctrinal advantages on comparators and stray remarks, sex stereotyping cases provide theoretical advances for Title VII litigation by providing a framework for spotting unlawful
bias in its modern forms. The facts involved in cutting edge sex stereotyping cases combine elements of both first and second generation discrimination, which makes actionable discrimination easier for courts to perceive in this context. Under stereotype theory, decisions infected with
impermissible stereotypes related to a protected class constitute decisions
241
“because of” that protected class. Thus failing to promote an employee
because she is perceived to be less committed to work as a mother, or because she is perceived not to fit in as a transgender woman becomes
overt, first generation-style discrimination. Yet recognizing caregiver and
transgender discrimination also required courts to see how stereotypes
about suitability for work that stand in contrast to workplace norms and
cultures are rooted in protected class status.
A vast body of research has documented numerous patterns of stere242
otyping that operate to disadvantage women at work. At its core, however, the actionable legal harm that arises in cutting-edge sex stereotyping cases can be grouped roughly into one of two basic types of cases—
models that can be applied to stereotyping regardless of protected class.
In one model, an individual employee is penalized based on the assumption that she will conform to a negative stereotype of her group—known
243
in social science as “descriptive” stereotyping. For example, a mother is
passed over for promotion because she is assumed to be less competent
or less committed to work. Groups stereotyped as lower in competence
often find themselves held to different or higher performance standards
than others whose competence is assumed, forcing them to continually
244
prove their competence. In the second model, an individual employee
is penalized based on the assumption that she should conform to a stereotype associated with her group and fails to do so—known as “prescriptive”

241

See supra Part I.B.3.
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 105, at 412–35 (citing and summarizing in detail
the social science on patterns of gender stereotypes at work).
243
See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes
Prevent Women’s Ascent Up the Organizational Ladder, 57 J. Soc. Issues 657, 657–74
(2001); Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Motherhood as a Status Characteristic, 60
J. Soc. Issues 683, 690–92 (2004); Yuracko, Soul of a Woman, supra note 110, at 763–64
(referring to this as “ascriptive” stereotyping); Herz, supra note 115, at 398–403, 405–
07 (same).
244
See, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Rachel Dempsey, What Works for Women at
Work: Four Patterns Working Women Need to Know 23–58 (2014) (naming and
describing this phenomenon as “Prove-It-Again” bias); Martha Foschi, Double
Standards for Competence: Theory and Research, 26 Ann. Rev. Sociol. 21, 21–42 (2000).
242
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245

stereotyping. For example, a pregnant woman is fired because her employer believes she should focus on her family instead of work, or a
transgender woman who was born biologically male is not hired for failing to dress and act masculine. Underlying both models is a perception
that the employee lacks “fit” with either the job or the workplace culture,
246
in ways that implicate protected class status. Caregiver and transgender
discrimination cases provide doctrinal paths for redressing these patterns, in which the perception and assessment of the employee’s competence and suitability for work is negatively affected by protected class stereotypes.
As described in Part III below, although the specific stereotypes associated with different protected classes may vary, the way in which such
stereotypes affect the workplace and lead to adverse employment actions
follow similar patterns; as such, all should be similarly actionable.
III. THE PROMISE OF UNIFICATION
For Title VII doctrine as a whole to benefit from advances in sex stereotyping cases, and in the interest of doctrinal coherence, courts should
recognize unlawful stereotyping similarly across all protected classes. This
means that, where any plaintiff alleges disparate treatment because of a
protected class, courts recognize the value of evidence evincing stereotypical beliefs and attitudes. Regardless of whether based on sex or race, the
social science of stereotyping is the same, and stereotypes may manifest
similarly in work structure and cultures. All discrimination case law may
benefit from the modern approach to proof some courts have taken in
sex stereotyping cases—an approach that more accurately reflect the operation of bias in the workplace today.
A. Extending Stereotype Theory Beyond Sex
When, in Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court first recognized the
role that stereotyping could play in an adverse employment action under
Title VII, the Court did not expressly limit its rationale to discrimination
based on the protected classification of sex. While the focus of the decision was on sex stereotyping, the Court’s analysis included a discussion of
247
the concept within the broader frame of Title VII as a whole. Thus

245

See, e.g., Heilman, Description and Prescription, supra note 243, at 657–74;
Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 243, at 690–92; Yuracko, Soul of a Woman, supra note
110, at 763–64; Herz, supra note 115, at 398–403, 405–407.
246
See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings: The Lack of Fit Model, 5
Res. Org. Behav. 270 (1983); Lauren A. Rivera, Hiring as Cultural Matching: The Case
of Elite Professional Service Firms, 77 Am. Sociol. Rev. 999 (2012); Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1259, 1267–70 (2000).
247
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 239, 253 (1989).
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plaintiffs may allege discrimination based on any protected class using a
248
stereotype theory.
Yet to date, stereotype theory has been used most robustly to allege
sex discrimination under Title VII. Far fewer cases alleging race or national origin discrimination articulate their case using a Price Waterhouse249
style stereotyping frame. And those that do are more likely to be un250
successful, often because evidence of racial or ethnic stereotyping is
251
more likely to be discounted as mere “stray remarks.” This lack of precedent, in turn, makes it less likely that other plaintiffs alleging race or national origin discrimination will include stereotype theory in their disparate treatment claims.
For doctrinal advances in sex stereotyping to be applied in a way that
unifies and modernizes antidiscrimination law, it is useful to uncover and
overcome the source of this disparity. The difference in how courts view
stereotyping on the basis of sex as opposed to race or national origin likely stems, at least in part, from the constitutional law of Equal Protec252
tion. To prove race discrimination in violation of the Constitution’s
guarantee of Equal Protection under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment requires proving that a state action had a discriminatory purpose;
248

See id. at 253–54. Separate from Title VII, courts have also recognized agerelated stereotyping under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See supra note
82.
249
In a recent Westlaw search of all federal cases citing Price Waterhouse, 667 cases
included references to stereotypes or stereotyping. When narrowed to identify cases
discussing Title VII and race or gender stereotypes, only 58 cases referenced race or
racial stereotypes, while 413 referenced sex or gender stereotypes (search conducted
June 1, 2016).
250
Recent data on caregiver discrimination cases (also known as “family
responsibilities discrimination” or “FRD” cases) show a particularly high success rate
for plaintiffs. In a dataset of over 4400 of such cases, plaintiffs had an overall success
rate of 52% in all FRD cases filed (60% in cases filed by mothers) and of 67% in all
FRD cases that went to trial (75% in trials in federal court), as compared to a plaintiff
success rate of 28–36% in all types of employment discrimination cases that went to
trial in federal court. Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Caregivers in the Workplace: Family
Responsibilities Discrimination Litigation Update 2016 4, 18, 21 & nn.47–48, 24 & nn.58–
59 (Center for Worklife Law, UC Hastings College of the Law 2016), http://
www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDupdate2016.pdf. See also generally Wendy Parker,
Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889 (2006)
251
See supra Part II.B.1.; infra Part III.B. But see generally Yuracko, The
Antidiscrimination Paradox, supra note 117 (challenging the contention that, in the
context of appearance/performance of race or gender at work, Title VII doctrine has
diverged to provide a more “expansive” reading of sex than race discrimination).
252
But see Yuracko, The Antidiscrimination Paradox, supra note 117, at 46–47
(suggesting that, to the extent gender identity receives greater protection than racial
identity at work, it is due more to “culture, history, and, perhaps, biology” than to law:
“Sex [and gender are] treated as rich and complex in ways that race is
not . . . . Race . . . is viewed as a mere technical difference of skin tone unassociated
with meaningful differences in behavior or self-presentation.”).

LCB_20_3_Art_04_Bornstein_Complete (Do Not Delete)

2016]

UNIFYING ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW

10/24/2016 8:29 AM

965

unlike under Title VII, a disparate impact theory of liability is not availa253
ble. Legal scholars have suggested that this animus-oriented approach
and a commitment to colorblindness under the Constitution has limited
254
Equal Protection’s ability to reach the full scope of race discrimination.
Stephen Rich has noted that the “discriminatory purpose doctrine” of
Equal Protection, which “requires evidence of malice, or animus,” is “illsuited to address ‘second generation discrimination’ that frequently re255
sults from unconscious stereotyping.” Likewise, Jerry Kang has suggested that a focus on “intent to harm minorities” and “facial racial classifications” has hindered Equal Protection doctrine’s ability to redress the
256
important harms of implicit racial bias and stereotyping.
In contrast, sex discrimination cases under Equal Protection law
have long recognized that acting on the basis of sex stereotypes constitutes intentional discrimination. Indeed, the recognition of sex stereotyping under Title VII in Price Waterhouse grew out of earlier Equal Protection cases holding that it was impermissible sex discrimination for state
and federal governments to enact laws that relied on gender stereo257
types. While early constitutional sex discrimination cases addressed explicit (rather than implicit) sex stereotypes, the idea that relying on sex
stereotypes could constitute a constitutional discriminatory purpose set
the stage for the expansion of sex stereotyping law under Title VII; the
same was not the case for racial stereotyping.
To the extent that Equal Protection doctrine spillover has hampered
courts’ ability and willingness to recognize actionable racial stereotyping
in the context of Title VII, this is unnecessary. Equal Protection and Title
253

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244–48 (1976).
See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 317–388; Ian Haney-López, Intentional
Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1779, 1781–89, 1853 (2012); Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent
and Impact: Some Behavioral Realism about Equal Protection, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 627, 646–48
(2015); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the
Law, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 464, 464–90 (2010); Rich, supra note 26, at 203, 230–32. Anita
Bernstein has also suggested that the constitutional law of stereotyping has not gone
as far as the Thirteenth Amendment allows: its prohibition on the “badges and
incidents” of slavery could plausibly support legislation to prohibit racial stereotyping.
Bernstein, supra note 92, at 705–711 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 441 (1968)).
255
Rich, supra note 26, at 231.
256
Kang, supra note 254, at 646–48. For a discussion of how sexual orientation
has been treated under Equal Protection doctrine, see generally Russell K. Robinson,
Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151 (2016) (identifying what Russell describes as
“LGBT exceptionalism” in constitutional law, whereby Supreme Court jurisprudence
has provided advantages in cases involving the rights of gays and lesbians unavailable
to other protected classifications, like race and sex).
257
See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251
(citing City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978)).
254
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VII doctrine are different, and courts in Title VII cases need not be similarly limited by adherence to a colorblindness ideal that obfuscates ac258
tionable racial stereotyping at work. The Supreme Court itself has identified these differences, by recognizing that disparate impact claims are
actionable under Title VII—and, most recently, under the Fair Housing
Act modeled on Title VII—despite its unavailability under Equal Protec259
tion.
Moreover, as a matter of doctrine and precedent, this is incorrect: a
coherent and robust modern approach to Title VII should recognize the
doctrinal differences between Title VII and Equal Protection and apply
stereotype theory consistently, regardless of protected class. Legal scholars—combined with recent sex stereotyping case law—have paved the
path for doing so. In the context of caregiver discrimination, Joan C. Williams has identified that most workplaces are gendered, designed around
a masculine norm of the “ideal worker” who is unencumbered and always
260
available for work. Because of this, as Williams and I have addressed in
previous work, “gender stereotypes arise in everyday workplace interactions”:
In a workplace that assumes an ideal worker without childbearing
or childrearing responsibilities, a worker who gives birth and returns to work as a mother will be treated as defective . . . . In a
workplace shaped by masculine norms, women can and do successfully litigate sex discrimination by using the stereotypes that arise in
261
everyday interactions as evidence of gender bias.

Sociologist Cecilia Ridgeway’s research identifying how people use sex
and gender as a “primary frame for organizing” how they relate to others
262
supports this approach. The gender frame “spreads gendered meanings” throughout society, including the workplace, which embodies “ste263
reotypic assumptions.” And, Ridgeway explains, “[w]hen structures and
procedures embody stereotypic gender assumptions, they themselves be264
come independent agents of bias in the workplace.”
In a parallel fashion, Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati’s work sug265
gests, in effect, that most workplaces are raced. While often espousing a
258

See generally Rich, supra note 26 (describing how Equal Protection and Title
VII doctrine have points of both convergence and divergence—for example, unlike
Equal Protection, “Title VII’s prohibitions against race discrimination in employment
have no animus requirement,” id. at 231.).
259
See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2516–26 (2015); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244–48 (1976).
260
See Williams, supra note 214, at 65–70.
261
See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 1338–39.
262
See Ridgeway, supra note 19, at 7.
263
Id. at 94–95.
264
Id. at 96.
265
See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 138 (describing the phenomenon of
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commitment to diversity and “colorblindness,” most predominantly white
workplaces start from certain institutional norms, in which many racial
and ethnic minorities find themselves as “Outsiders” who must adopt a
“Working Identity” to succeed at work:
[R]acial stereotypes often conflict with institutional criteria . . . [T]he existence of negative racial stereotypes (particularly as
they conflict with institutional norms) creates an incentive for em266
ployees to work their identity to negate those stereotypes . . .

Racial minorities, like caregivers, may encounter stereotyping from their
very lack of “fit” with the institutional norms around which the workplace
is designed; moreover, they may be held to different standards of per267
formance and forced to re-prove their competence. They should, likewise, be able to litigate race discrimination using everyday stereotyping as
evidence of racial bias.
Of course, as described previously, not all stereotyping is discriminatory or illegal, and stereotype theory may not reach all aspects of gender
268
or race performance, identity, or difference. But when employees are
penalized at work based on stereotypes that affect perceptions of their
competence or suitability for work, they should be similarly actionable,
regardless of protected class.
Some courts have successfully recognized the application of a Price
Waterhouse-style stereotyping theory to race discrimination. The First Cir269
cuit’s decision in Thomas v. Eastman Kodak provides an example. After
years of employment with excellent performance, the plaintiff—the only
African-American woman in a department of six—was assigned a new supervisor who undercut and criticized the plaintiff at every turn, denied
and blocked her opportunities for advancement, and assessed her with
“inaccurately low scores on her annual performance appraisals” that ul270
timately led to her termination. The court recognized that the plaintiff
was “alleg[ing] a more subtle type of disparate treatment,” focused on
“[t]he role of . . . stereotyping . . . discussed most thoroughly in that
branch of disparate treatment law developed apart from the McDonnell
271
Douglas . . . framework . . . known as the Price Waterhouse framework.”
Based on both stereotyping and comparator evidence, the court reversed
summary judgment against the plaintiff, stating clearly that “[s]tereotypes
or cognitive biases based on race are as incompatible with Title VII’s

“Working Identity”).
266
Id. at 26; see also id. at 1–35, 134–48.
267
See supra notes 243–46.
268
See supra notes 40, 102, 115–117 and accompanying text.
269
183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999).
270
Id. at 45–46.
271
Id. at 58–60.
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mandate as stereotypes based on age or sex, [thus] here too, ‘the entire
272
spectrum of disparate treatment’ is prohibited.”
Likewise, in Kimble v. Wisconsin Dept. of Workforce Development, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held in favor of an African-American male plaintiff who alleged intersectional sex and race
discrimination in pay on the basis of both comparator and stereotyping
273
evidence. The court cited both Thomas and Price Waterhouse and discussed the literature on stereotyping and implicit bias, before finding
that his supervisor “seemed to regard plaintiff as if he were ‘veiled with
images of incompetency,’” which supported the plaintiff’s inference of
274
discrimination. Despite this clear precedent, successful application of
the stereotyping approach beyond the protected class of sex remains lim275
ited.
B. Revisiting Comparators and Stray Remarks
To move the modern stereotyping frame beyond sex discrimination
cases more concretely, courts can and should apply the specific doctrinal
advancements on comparators and stray remarks to all employment discrimination cases. First, based on the development of the law on comparators in caregiver and transgender discrimination cases, all plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination regardless of protected class should
have the opportunity to create an inference of discrimination and survive
the pleading stage without “comparator” evidence. Circuits that still cling
to the comparator concept, insisting that the McDonnell Douglas framework requires a comparator at either the prima facie or pretext stage,
should be bound by precedent on comparators, most recently in the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Young v. UPS. In Young, the Court said,
once again and definitively, that comparators are not required to create
276
an inference of discrimination under Title VII. Moreover, even in the
context of the one limited piece of the statute that requires comparisons—that pregnant women be treated “the same . . . as” employees with
similar physical ability or inability to work—the Court said that the statute does not require that employees be otherwise similarly situated, “simi277
lar in all but the protected ways.” Where a plaintiff alleging disparate
treatment lacks comparator evidence but produces relevant evidence of
stereotyping relating to the protected class, caregiver and transgender

272
273
274
275
276
277

Id. at 42, 59, 60.
690 F.Supp.2d 765 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
Id. at 768–69, 770–71,775–78 (citation omitted).
See supra notes 249–51 and accompanying text.
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015).
Id.
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discrimination precedent hold that this may create an inference of dis278
crimination.
Thus a plaintiff who believes that stereotypes about his race or national origin played a role in an adverse employment action he experienced, particularly if those stereotypes relate to his work capabilities or
commitment, suitability for promotion, or ability to fit in with the work
culture, may use a stereotype theory and stereotyping evidence to create
an inference of discrimination, just as caregiver and transgender plaintiffs have done with evidence of sex stereotyping. Counterfactual application of this theory to examples of cases in which race discrimination
plaintiffs have lost on summary judgment due to lack of comparator evidence illustrate the incoherence of such holdings.
In one case, the Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment against the
plaintiff, a black doctor of African national origin, who alleged that he
was discriminated against because of his race and national origin when
279
the hospital at which he worked terminated his fellowship. After describing his requirement to prove, as the fourth prong of his prima facie
case, that he “was replaced by someone outside the protected class or was
treated differently than similarly-situated, nonprotected employees,” the
court held that, because no such comparator existed, he could not pro280
ceed with his race discrimination claim. The only other similarly situated employee was African-American; because the other doctor was “of the
same racial group,” the court held, he could not serve as a “non281
protected employee” to satisfy the plaintiff’s required proof. In another
case, the Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment against a plaintiff who
alleged race discrimination when he was singled out, given poor performance reviews, and suspended for errors he alleged were attributed to
282
him but were actually the fault of his coworker and supervisor. Again,
the court took the narrowest view of the comparator requirement, finding that the plaintiff’s white coworker who did the exact same job could
not serve as a comparator because the coworker was only in that position
283
on a temporary basis. In neither of these two cases did the court make
any mention of creating an inference of discrimination: both plaintiffs

278

See id.; supra Part II.A.2. (caregiver discrimination); Part II.A.3. (transgender
discrimination).
279
Adebisi v. Univ. of Tenn., 341 F. App’x 111, 112 (6th Cir. 2009).
280
See id.
281
See id. Note the court held that this comparator was suitable to meet the
fourth prong of the prima facie case for plaintiff’s national origin discrimination
claim but upheld summary judgment on that claim, too, based on plaintiff’s failure to
prove pretext. Id. at 113.
282
Zanders v. Potter, 223 F. App’x 470, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2007).
283
Id.
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lacked similarly situated comparators, so both plaintiffs lost on summary
284
judgment.
Indeed, it is entirely possible that neither plaintiff had evidence on
which to legitimately support including a stereotype theory or frame as
part of his claims; neither case decision makes any mention of stereotyping. On the other hand, both cases involved subjective assessments of the
plaintiffs’ performance, and both plaintiffs believed they were singled out
285
and subject to unfair scrutiny due to their race. If the plaintiffs offered
any evidence that racially stereotyped perceptions of their work abilities
played a role in their adverse actions, they should have been able to create an inference of discrimination with the stereotyping evidence, even in
the absence of comparators. What is more, because both plaintiffs were
in the Sixth Circuit and both decisions were made after that court’s 2004
decision in Smith v. City of Salem, the court was bound by Smith and subsequent Sixth Circuit precedent in which plaintiffs alleging transgender
discrimination were able to create an inference of discrimination based
286
on a stereotype theory with little or no comparative evidence.
Current social science research shows us how individuals can be
harmed by stereotyping even if other members of their protected class
287
are not. This insight, coupled with the persistence of race and gender
288
segregation in our workforce, makes moving beyond the comparator
requirement is essential to modernizing Title VII doctrine to reach discrimination in its current forms. In her work extensively documenting
the rise and continued grip of the comparator requirement, Suzanne
Goldberg describes how cases alleging harassment or stereotyping provide a useful “contextual” approach, whereby courts “look[] to all of the
surrounding circumstances for the ways in which the protected traits may
have operated to affect employer decisionmaking,” and argues similarly
that this contextual approach should be a “legitimate analytic option in
289
all cases.” Significant court of appeals and even Supreme Court precedent in contemporary sex stereotyping cases now provide the model for
doing so.
Likewise, where plaintiffs provide evidence of stereotypical beliefs in
the workplace, courts can and should follow advances in the law in caregiver and transgender discrimination cases to view such evidence as relevant stereotyping evidence, rather than discounting it as “stray remarks.”
All plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination regardless of protected
class should be able to benefit from courts’ understanding, in the care-

284
285
286
287
288
289

Adebisi, 341 F. App’x at 112–13; Zanders, 223 F. App’x at 470–71.
Adebisi, 341 F. App’x at 113; Zanders, 223 F. App’x at 470.
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004); supra Part II.A.
See supra note 138.
See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
See Goldberg, supra note 130, at 779–80, 808.
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giver context, of how stereotypes that relate to a plaintiff’s suitability or
“fit” at work may relate to an adverse employment decision, even if not
temporally proximate or expressed by the ultimate decision maker.
Moreover, the treatment of gender stereotyping as direct evidence of discrimination in some transgender discrimination cases offers the possibility of returning direct evidence to its rightful status: should a plaintiff
have evidence that an adverse action was taken because of a stereotype
associated with a protected class, courts should recognize that as twentyfirst-century direct evidence.
Again, applying this insight counterfactually to cases in which plaintiffs had useful stereotyping evidence discounted as stray remarks illustrates its value to coherence in the doctrine of Title VII. For example, the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment against an African-American plaintiff who was terminated from his
position as a regional sales representative at a medical packaging compa290
ny. The plaintiff employee alleged disparate treatment on the basis of
comparative evidence, claiming that the defendant employer misconstrued the plaintiff’s performance and did not terminate “similarly situat291
ed white employees.” In its analysis of pretext, the court noted that,
“although [the p]laintiff made no arguments about this issue in his
briefs,” there was “evidence in the record” that the plaintiff’s supervisor
292
“made a comment . . . of a racial nature.” As the evidence showed, the
supervisor had made remarks to the plaintiff, shortly after he was hired,
“to the effect that black men know how to post-up in the low post [in
293
basketball], but do not know the medical packaging business.” Yet just
as quickly as it identified this stereotypical statement, the court found it
to be “simply a stray remark, which no reasonable jury could find” sup294
ported proof of pretext in the case.
To be sure, there was significant evidence in the case documenting
plaintiff’s performance problems, which was the defendant’s proffered
295
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. Still, the
plaintiff’s comparative theory of disparate treatment turned on a double
standard in how performance (competence) was measured: he believed
he should have been judged on improvement over the prior year’s sales
as opposed to total sales in the abstract, and he alleged that white em296
ployees with similar relative performance were not terminated. And yet
290

Taylor v. Amcor Flexibles Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 501, 511 (D.N.J. 2009), as cited
in Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 164.
291
Taylor, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
292
Id. at 511.
293
Id. The phrase “post-up in the low post” is a reference to a basketball
maneuver.
294
Id.
295
Id. at 507–11.
296
Id. at 506–07.
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he neither alleged stereotyping nor even highlighted the supervisor’s
statement, which the court found concerning enough to highlight itself
297
before granting summary judgment. Had the plaintiff included a stereotype theory, alleging not only that his race but that racial stereotypes—
here clearly related to his knowledge of and suitability for work in his
field because he was black—led to his disparate treatment, precedent
from the sex stereotyping cases should have governed. Viewed under the
broader lens of stereotyping evidence, this statement—made by the very
decision maker who assessed his performance and terminated him—was
anything but stray.
In her detailed analysis of the stray remarks doctrine, Kerri Stone
explains how the concept of stray remarks is out of step with modern un298
derstandings of the reality of social cognition. The fact that courts not
only disqualify stray remarks from serving as direct evidence but also
generally discount the inferential value of such remarks, Stone argues,
“fails to comport with an informed understanding of how human beings
299
cultivate, harbor, and express bias against others.” The insistence on
temporal proximity of any comment evincing bias is particularly illogical,
Stone notes, because of the very fact that much of this discrimination is
subconscious or implicit: “the utterance of a comment in another context
lends credence to the theory that the decision maker’s bias carried over
300
from her life outside of work into her professional life.” Numerous
courts have been able to recognize the importance of taking a broader
view of stereotyping evidence in the context of sex discrimination cases;
they can and should apply this approach to all discrimination cases regardless of protected class.
C. Removing Roadblocks with Stereotype Theory
Beyond its ability to overcome the comparator requirement and the
stray remarks doctrine, applying a stereotype frame to cases pled under
the two other theories for litigating second generation discrimination—
disparate treatment involving implicit bias and disparate impact—may
serve as an important response to recent constraints placed on those theories’ by the Roberts Court.
1. Stereotyping as the “Glue” for Implicit Bias Class Cases
As described previously, in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs’ social framework proof that the company’s policy of relying on unchecked subjective decision making fostered implicit bias re-

297

Id.
Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 182–89; see also Albiston et al., supra
note 213, at 1293.
299
Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 204, at 183.
300
Id. at 184, 188.
298
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301

sulting in sex discrimination. The Court majority found plaintiffs
lacked evidentiary “glue” to link the decisions together—as scholars later
described it, a lack of some “connective tissue” or a “coherent narrative”
302
of discrimination.
Indeed, it was stereotyping evidence that plaintiffs used as this glue
when they later pursued the same claims but across a smaller region of
the company. On remand after the Supreme Court’s 2011 Wal-Mart decision, when the same plaintiffs narrowed their case to focus on a smaller
region of mostly California stores, they included sex stereotyping evidence evincing “a culture and philosophy of gender bias shared by the
303
relevant decision makers.” As described by the California federal district court hearing the new version of the case, the plaintiffs provided evidence that, at a required training, California store managers were told
the lack of women in Wal-Mart senior management was “attributable to
men being ‘more aggressive in achieving those levels of responsibility,’”
and were “cautioned that efforts to promote women could lead to the se304
lection of less qualified candidates.” The plaintiffs also offered evidence of statements by the company CEO “that could be interpreted as
communicating that men had traits that were more likely to make them
305
successful.”
Despite the fact that “the basic theory of Plaintiffs’ claims
has changed little,” the addition of stereotyping evidence was responsive
enough to the Supreme Court’s holding—which “rested not on a total
rejection of plaintiffs’ theories, but on the inadequacy of their proof”—
306
for the district court to deny a motion to dismiss the case.
Likewise, other recent cases alleging a pattern or practice of sex discrimination, including those filed against pharmaceutical companies Novartis and Daiichi Sankyo and financial giant Goldman Sachs, have survived challenges by alleging an implicit bias theory with a stereotyping
frame. Plaintiffs in these cases used stereotyping evidence to bolster their
statistical evidence, arguing both that workplace structures allowed implicit bias to infect many individual employment decisions and that those

301

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553–57 (2011). See Part I.B.2.
Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2552; Selmi, Theorizing, supra note 88, at 481; Zatz,
supra note 88, at 388, 390–91.
303
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 8, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 21, 2012), (No. C 01-02252 CRB).
304
Id.
305
Id.
306
Id. After surviving the motion to dismiss, however, the plaintiffs again lost on
their motion for class certification, as the court held that the class was still too big to
meet commonality required for class treatment. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 964 F.
Supp. 2d 1115, 1125, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2013). For most cases, the ability to survive a
motion to dismiss would still be a significant victory; after twelve years of litigation
with no settlement, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs were in a unique position.
302
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decisions were made within a work culture of gender stereotyping. The
Novartis plaintiffs alleged stereotyping evidence including: one manager’s expressed preference not to hire young women because “[f]irst
comes love, then comes marriage, then comes flex time and a baby carriage”; another’s alleged encouragement of a pregnant employee to get
an abortion; and a third’s urging employees during a training “to avoid
308
getting pregnant.” The Daiichi Sankyo plaintiffs described “a sales
strategy built upon gender stereotypes,” alleging that “pregnant women
and working mothers with young children [did] not fit within the stereotypical role promoted by [that] strategy,” and that female employees were
“actively discouraged from having children”—warned that they’d be
“committing ‘career suicide’” if they became pregnant or sought preg309
nancy leave or reduced schedules. And the Goldman Sachs plaintiffs
successfully distinguished their claims from the Wal-Mart case by both
their smaller class size and by identifying several work policies known to
foster sex stereotyping, including “360-degree review” performance eval310
uation and “tap on the shoulder” promotion selection systems. Tellingly, each of these successful cases included class-wide claims of caregiver
discrimination and evidence of a culture of impermissible stereotypes
that linked protected class status (sex, motherhood) to a lack of suitability for work.
2. Stereotyping to “Smoke Out” Intent in Disparate Impact Cases
Less obvious, but still important to recognize, is the potential for the
role of stereotypes in disparate impact claims—particularly given the
Roberts Court majority’s view that disparate impact theory should be applied narrowly and is most properly used as a way to “smoke out” dis311
guised intentional discrimination. Stereotyping evidence, traditionally
associated with disparate treatment, serves a different role in disparate
impact cases, which, as described previously, do not follow McDonnell
307

See Wellens v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., No. 13-cv-00581-WHO, 2014 WL 2126877,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2014); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 1:10-cv06950-LBS-JCF, 2012 WL 2912741, at *1–4 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2012); Velez v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp., 244 F.R.D. 243, 260–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Daiichi Sankyo Gender
Pay, Promotion and Pregnancy Discrimination Class Action, Sanford Heisler Kimpel, LLP,
http://www.sanfordheisler.com/cases/daiichi-sankyo-gender-discrimination-classaction; Goldman Sachs Gender Discrimination Class Action, Goldman Gender Case,
http://goldmangendercase.com/; Novartis Pharmaceutical Gender Discrimination Class
Action, Sanford Heisler Kimpel, LLP, http://www.sanfordheisler.com/cases/novartis-

pharmaceutical-gender-discrimination-class-action. But see E.E.O.C. v. Bloomberg L.P., 778
F.Supp.2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that stereotyping evidence was insufficient to
support plaintiffs’ pattern or practice sex discrimination case).
308

Velez, 244 F.R.D. at 267–68.
See Wellens v. Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., Complaint, No. C 13 0581, 2013 WL
497246 (N.D.Cal., February 11, 2013).
310
See Chen-Oster, 2012 WL 2912741, at *2–4.
311
See supra Part I.B.1; supra note 72.
309
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Douglas burden-shifting but instead require plaintiff to show that an employer’s facially neutral policy creates an adverse impact on members of a
protected class, and that the practice is neither justified by a business necessity nor can be replaced by an alternative, less discriminatory prac312
tice. Yet stereotypes may play a part in various stages of this framework—for example, if how the defendant employer justifies the policy as
something that is a business necessity reflects not a real “necessity” but
rather the product of stereotyped thinking, or if the employer’s view that
a less discriminatory alternative practice will not suffice relies on stereotypical beliefs rather than reality.
The Third Circuit case Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transpor313
tation Authority (SEPTA) suggests an example. In Lanning, female applicants for transit authority police positions alleged sex discrimination
under a disparate impact theory, challenging the requirement that, to be
314
hired, applicants must run 1.5 miles in 12 minutes. Plaintiffs demonstrated that only 12% of female applicants as compared to 60% of male
applicants could pass this screening test, but that officers hired prior to
315
the institution of the requirement were not held to the same standard.
The court’s analysis focused on whether SEPTA could meet the “business
necessity” defense allowed to employers under the disparate impact theo316
ry. As the court defined it, to be a “business necessity,” a test cut-off
score with disparate results must “measur[e] the minimum qualifications
necessary for successful performance of the job,” which the court held
317
SEPTA had not proven. “A business necessity standard that wholly defers to an employer’s judgment as to what is desirable in an employee,”
the court noted, “is completely inadequate in combating covert discrimi318
nation based upon societal prejudices.”

312

See id.
181 F.3d 478 (3rd Cir 1999).
314
Lanning, 181 F.3d at 482.
315
Id. at 483–86.
316
Id. at 490–94.
317
Id.
318
Id. at 490. In a subsequent decision, the Third Circuit affirmed judgment in
favor of SEPTA, holding that, after “allow[ing] the parties to expand the record in
keeping with our newly-announced standard…SEPTA produced…competent
evidence to support the finding” that its test did, in fact, “measur[e] the minimum
qualifications necessary…thus…showing business necessity.” Lanning v SEPTA, 308
F.3d 286, 288–93 (3d Cir. 2002). However, relying on Lanning, other plaintiffs have
survived summary judgment where they showed that a physical ability test based on
assumptions had a disparate impact by sex. See, e.g., Easterling v. Connecticut, 783
F.Supp.2d 323, 343 (2011) (noting that defense expert “stated that ‘it’s reasonable to
assume [that] higher levels of fitness correlate with more positive outcomes and fewer
negative outcomes,’ but did not provide any evidence” to support assumption);
United States v. City of Erie, 411 F.Supp.2d 524, 555, 558–59 (2005) (noting that
defense expert “assume[d] one of the facts that Title VII requires the City to prove”).
313
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Other plaintiffs have succeeded in challenging employers’ assumptions of what constitutes a “necessary” employment practice by exposing
stereotyped thinking. When a postal worker alleged that a policy prohibiting use of sick leave to care for sick family members had a disparate impact by sex, she included evidence that, prior to the imposition of this
policy by a new postmaster, she had successfully used sick leave to care
319
for her sick child without incident. A Texas federal district court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment and ordered addi320
tional briefing in her case. When female workers at a specialty glass
plant alleged that the ranking system used to determine who would be
laid off had a disparate impact on women, they included evidence that
the discretionary system was used within a work context marked by gender stereotyping, including supervisors who “were . . . often dismissive of
women in the workplace, derisively referring to certain tasks as ‘women’s
321
work.’” A Pennsylvania federal district court agreed, denying summary
judgment for the employer and holding that the evaluation system failed
322
the business necessity defense against a disparate impact claim. The
ranking system, the court explained, “built in a bias towards the skills
men had obtained in a workplace that was largely sex-segregated,” so that
“a jury could…find that the [system] was designed to perpetuate the
long-term biases in the factory and did not adequately measure who
323
could actually perform the new jobs.”
As these cases demonstrate, where a policy or practice that has a discriminatory impact is based on assumptions about what makes someone
suitable for work, stereotyping evidence may be useful in overcoming an
employer’s “business necessity” defense and unmasking biases built into
workplace structures.
CONCLUSION
Looking to the success of cases on the margins of antidiscrimination
law provides a unique perspective from which to see doctrinal and theoretical innovations. At a time when the Roberts Court has acted to limit
disparate impact and implicit bias-based disparate treatment theories,
federal courts faced with caregiver and transgender discrimination cases
have been able to recognize the unlawful impact of protected class stereotypes in the workplace. Relying on stereotypes to make decisions is not

319

See Roberts v. U.S. Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
Id. at 284, 287–89; see also Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l, 660 F.2d 811, 819–20
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (denying summary judgment where rule prohibiting leave over ten
days had a disparate impact by sex/pregnancy).
321
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Schott N. Am., Inc., 2008 WL 4452715,
*4–8 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 29, 2008).
322
Id. at *12–14.
323
Id. at *14.
320
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in and of itself always harmful, and many stereotypes are based on demographically accurate information. But when protected class stereotypes
involve assumptions about an individual’s work competence, commitment, or fit, Title VII prohibits them—regardless of how an employer
treats anyone else in the workplace. Caregiver and transgender discrimination cases have demonstrated this line, and have provided new pathways of proof that may benefit all plaintiffs alleging second generation
discrimination.
Of course, relying on stereotype theory and stereotyping evidence as
a means to unify and revive antidiscrimination litigation is not without its
own limitations. Critics would argue that stereotyping is not a panacea to
constraints in antidiscrimination law for a number of reasons. First, not
every plaintiff can produce stereotyping evidence. The reason why such
324
strong “loose lips” evidence exists in caregiver and transgender cases is
that mothers and transgender employees are at the margins of what is
protected by Title VII (which also explains why such cases have been
marginalized). People are more likely to express stereotypical beliefs
about gender than about race—particularly ideas about motherhood,
femininity, and masculinity—because those beliefs are, on some level,
325
more culturally embedded and socially acceptable. Second, even when
a plaintiff might have evidence of stereotypes associated with race or national origin, it is more likely that such stereotyping evidence will be discounted as bias “in the air” and not related to the adverse employment
326
decision or evidence from which to infer discrimination. Third, as suggested by Suzanne Goldberg in discussing alternatives to the comparator
requirement, allowing plaintiffs to survive summary judgment on the basis of stereotyping evidence could open the floodgates to more cases getting further along in the litigation process, causing employers and the
327
courts to incur associated costs.
A stereotyping approach will not miraculously solve these problems.
Still, social science tells us that stereotypes of all kinds are still very
strongly held and that people commonly rely upon stereotypes when
328
making subjective assessments and decisions. Applying a stereotyping

324

See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 Harv. Women’s L.J. 77, 92, 107
(2003) (naming and describing “loose lips” evidence).
325
See Selmi, Evolution, supra note 105, at 979 (“One important difference with
gender stereotypes is that they are less likely to be implicit in nature if by implicit we
mean that the person who holds the stereotype is unaware of doing so. A person may
be unwilling to admit fidelity to the gender stereotype, but that is not the same as
being unaware of its force.”).
326
See Goldberg, supra note 130, at 787 & n.197 (citing Carbado & Gulati, supra
note 138).
327
Id. at 811.
328
See Krieger, supra note 9, at 1186–90, 1241–44.
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lens to an employment discrimination case does not necessarily require
unearthing the rare overt statement of stereotyping that may not exist in
a race or national origin case; by applying the same theory of why and
when caregiver and transgender stereotyping at work is unlawful, the approach becomes clear. When a protected class stereotype infects perceptions of an employee’s work—for example, assessment of the employee’s
competence, suitability for leadership, or “cultural fit”—and the result is
an adverse employment action, courts should recognize that as illegal
discrimination. That is the harm that lies under the surface of much covert second generation discrimination. Courts have been able to recognize
these connections and the social science of stereotyping in sex stereotyping cases; they can and should do so for all such cases, regardless of protected class.
To the extent that an “everybody stereotypes” approach risks opening the floodgates to questionable discrimination claims, such concerns
are unfounded. While everybody may stereotype, Price Waterhouse tells us
that stereotyping is only unlawful and actionable under Title VII when it
329
plays a role in an adverse employment decision. Any plaintiff alleging a
stereotype theory still has to use stereotyping or comparative evidence to
create an inference of discrimination to survive through the pleading
stage. The comparator requirement and stray remarks doctrine are so ingrained in the consciousness of federal court judges that if a plaintiff has
convinced a court to infer discrimination with stereotyping evidence
alone, that plaintiff has a legitimate claim that should not be dismissed.
And, should the number of cases and associated costs to courts and
employers rise by any noticeable measure, that is not necessarily a bad
330
thing. The Title VII litigation frameworks were not created by the Supreme Court so that most employment discrimination plaintiffs would
lose on summary judgment; they were created to root out cases in which
it was unlikely that impermissible consideration of a protected class motivated the employer’s actions. Were more cases to survive the pleading
stage based on stereotyping evidence, employers would have an important incentive to take stereotyping seriously and make greater efforts
to reduce reliance on stereotypes in workplace decision making. The ultimate result would be to reinvigorate Title VII and its ability to reach
workplace attitudes and practices that continue to stand as significant
barriers to equality in employment.
Recent plaintiff successes in pioneering sex stereotyping cases suggest the potential for evolution in antidiscrimination law. Transgender
329

See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–55 (1989); supra Part I.B.3.
See Goldberg, supra note 130, at 811 (“I would argue . . . these costs are more
than matched by the benefit of having open jurisprudential discussion and debate
about the proper reach of discrimination doctrine. . . . A move to a contextual
evaluation would open the possibility of conversation and perhaps lead to refinement
of the jurisprudence.”).
330
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and caregiver discrimination cases demonstrate that stereotypes operate
in similar ways to disadvantage employees based on a perceived lack of
competence or suitability for work. Caregiver discrimination cases have
also helped unearth that many workplace structures are inherently gendered—that is, that many work norms, policies, and practices embody
331
and foster reliance on gender stereotypes. Combining these two insights offers a modern way to recognize entrenched bias in the workplace. Regardless of the protected class in question, all courts can and
should apply the lessons provided by recent leading-edge sex stereotyping cases—cases that demonstrate how, even fifty years after Title VII’s
enactment, litigation under the statute continues to spark progress toward ever greater workplace equality.

331

See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 107, at 1338–39.

